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THE LAWMAKING FAMILY 
NOA BEN-ASHER∗ 
Increasingly there are conflicts over families trying to “opt out” of 
various legal structures, especially public school education. Examples of 
opting-out conflicts include a father seeking to exempt his son from health 
education classes; a mother seeking to exempt her daughter from 
mandatory education about the perils of female sexuality; and a 
vegetarian student wishing to opt out of in-class frog dissection. The 
Article shows that, perhaps paradoxically, the right to direct the 
upbringing of children was more robust before it was constitutionalized by 
the Supreme Court in Meyer v. Nebraska (1923) and Pierce v. Society of 
Sisters (1925). In fact, the position of U.S. courts on opting-out conflicts 
has shifted dramatically over the twentieth century. In the early twentieth 
century, parents mostly prevailed in such conflicts. Today, the state 
typically prevails. Contemporary conflicts often involve public-school 
management of health, sexuality, and liberal development of students 
through surveys, nudges, and mandatory readings. When these techniques 
infringe on familial liberty, lawmakers lack conceptual tools to respond. A 
new understanding of familial liberty is needed. 
This Article offers that understanding. The approach here is based on 
the idea of family laws. Family laws are legal systems that families create 
or adopt to govern their day-to-day lives. These rules exist independently 
of state laws, and can be religious, such as Amish or Buddhist family laws, 
or secular, such as feminist or vegetarian family laws. The Article 
identifies three basic characteristics of family laws: They are (1) general 
and articulable; (2) grounded in religion, ethics, or morality; and 
(3) perceived as binding by members of a particular family. The Article 
argues that, with some limiting principles, lawmaking families should 
possess a liberty to opt out of programs and policies that conflict with a 
family law. Through an examination of three different types of family 
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laws—religious, feminist, and vegetarian—the Article demonstrates how 
the proposed approach would empower existing lawmaking families. 
Almost a century has passed since the Supreme Court declared the liberty 
of parents to educate their children in Meyer v. Nebraska. It is time to 
breathe new life into this moribund liberty by empowering the Lawmaking 
Family.  
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INTRODUCTION 
In January of 2012, the New Hampshire legislature passed a bill that 
grants families the right to exempt a child for any reason from any 
program offered by a public school.1 With this legislation, New Hampshire 
joined other state legislatures in recognizing a familial right that this 
Article calls “the liberty to opt out.”2 Examples of opting-out conflicts 
include a father seeking to exempt his son from health education classes 
because he wants to educate him regarding health matters at home;3 a 
mother seeking to exempt her daughter from mandatory education about 
the perils of female sexuality with which she morally disagrees;4 a 
vegetarian parent wishing to avoid exposing her children to teachings 
about the nutritional benefits of eating animals;5 and a Native-American 
father seeking to exempt his son from a mandatory short-hair policy for 
boys because it violates his tradition.6 These diverse and sharply felt 
conflicts exemplify the jurisprudence of opting out.  
The current legal framework for disputes over opting out stems from 
lower court interpretations of Meyer v. Nebraska,7 Pierce v. Society of 
Sisters,8 and Wisconsin v. Yoder.9 In these cases the Court recognized and 
enforced the liberty of parents to direct the upbringing of their children. 
This Article shows, however, that despite this constitutional right, families 
in the past four decades have typically failed when trying to opt out of 
programs and policies of public education. The judicial deference to 
schools, as reflected by the adoption and application of the “coercion 
standard,” signals the decline of the familial liberty to opt out. Courts have 
ruled in favor of parents in opting-out disputes only where a program or 
 
 
 1. Veto override gives parents more control over what their kids are taught, 
UNIONLEADER.COM (Jan. 4, 2012, 2:05 PM), http://www.unionleader.com/article/20120104/NEWS 
04/120109976/0/news05. New Hampshire’s state legislature overrode the governor’s veto to pass the 
bill, H.B. 542, 2011 Gen. Ct., 162d Sess. (N.H. 2012).  
 2. See infra Part II.B.  
 3. Leebaert v. Harrington, 332 F.3d 134, 138 (2d Cir. 2003) (stating that “[r]equiring students to 
attend health education classes serves a legitimate state interest and is reasonably related to that 
interest.”). 
 4. Miller v. Mitchell, 598 F.3d 139 (3d Cir. 2010) (holding that the District Attorney of 
Wyoming County, Pennsylvania violated a mother’s fundamental right to raise her child without 
undue state interference). 
 5. See infra Part III.C.3. 
 6. A.A. v. Needville Indep. Sch. Dist., 611 F.3d 248 (5th Cir. 2010) (holding that a child 
succeeded in his free exercise claim under the Texas Religious Freedom Restoration Act because his 
belief was substantially burdened by the district’s grooming policy). 
 7. 262 U.S. 390 (1923). 
 8. 268 U.S. 510 (1925). 
 9. 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
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policy was so coercive that the family’s “entire way of life” was 
threatened.10  
Should families possess broad opting-out powers, such as those 
recently enacted in New Hampshire, or narrow ones, as courts in the past 
four decades have consistently held? This Article proposes a middle way. 
The proposed alternative centers on what I call “family laws.” We know 
that laws made by courts and legislators shape families, but a reverse 
phenomenon is often overlooked: families also make laws.11 Family laws 
are legal systems that families create or adopt to govern their day-to-day 
lives.12 They exist independently of state laws, and can be religious, such 
as Amish or Buddhist family laws, or secular, such as feminist or 
vegetarian family laws.  
While the right of insular communities to sustain separate ways of life 
has received judicial and scholarly attention,13 the idea that the smaller 
unit of the family also possesses lawmaking capacities, has not. Moreover, 
the focus on insular communities may be misleading. Some families, 
especially religious ones, do adopt laws within insular communities.14 But 
other families may create and adopt family laws independent of such 
communities. For example, a family may adopt a feminist family law that 
requires equal child-care duties by parents, or a vegetarian family law that 
prohibits killing animals. Those feminist and vegetarian family laws can 
emerge outside of any identifiable community. They nonetheless deserve 
legal protections. This Article proposes that when a family law is at stake, 
a dissenting family should enjoy a liberty to opt out of mandatory 
educational programs or policies that conflict with the established family 
 
 
 10. Id. at 216; see also Arnold v. Bd. of Educ., 880 F.2d 305 (11th Cir. 1989); Gruenke v. Seip, 
225 F.3d 290 (3d Cir. 2000); A.A., 611 F.3d 248; Miller v. Mitchell, 598 F.3d 139 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 11. In fact, Plato had speculated that lawmaking originated in families who legislated for 
themselves. PLATO, THE LAWS, Book III (680b), at 79 (Penguin 2004). “The Athenian” quotes the 
words of the poet Homer: 
‘No laws, no councils for debate have they: 
They live on the tips of lofty mountains 
In hollow cases; each man lays down the law 
To wife and children, with no regard for neighbor.’ 
Id.  
 12. For further discussion of family laws as legal systems, see infra Part III.A.  
 13. See Pierce, 268 U.S. 510 (holding that a statute that required every parent or guardian of a 
child between eight and sixteen years to send the child to public school violated the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (holding that compelling Amish children 
to attend public school after eight years of education violates their parents’ free exercise rights); 
Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term: Forward: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 
4, 4 (1983).  
 14. See, e.g., Yoder, 406 U.S. 205. 
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law. The liberty to opt out should be broad but not absolute; the Article 
outlines some of its limiting principles.15 
The remainder of this Article has three Parts. Part I introduces the core 
dilemma. Most children are at the same time affiliated both with families, 
of which they are current members, and with the state, of which they are 
future adult citizens. This Part examines how liberal theories have treated 
conflicts involving this dual identity of children. While some theorists 
have prioritized the child’s identity as a citizen of the liberal state, others 
have argued for stronger parental authority and for a more meaningful 
parental right to direct the upbringing of children.  
Part II examines the liberty to opt out of public education before and 
after the Supreme Court cases of Meyer and Pierce.16 This Part shows that, 
perhaps paradoxically, the right to direct the upbringing of children was 
more robust before it was constitutionalized. In the era before Meyer and 
Pierce, judicial treatment of opting-out disputes had three main features. 
First, courts framed the opting-out conflict as an attempt by teachers to 
dictate the curriculum. Second, opting-out claims were usually successful, 
and this was true regardless of whether those claims were grounded in 
religion. Third, courts viewed public schools primarily as service 
providers, rather than as governmental entities authorized to manage 
health and liberal education. By contrast, since the Supreme Court 
constitutionalized the right to direct the upbringing of children in Meyer 
and Pierce, that right has eroded. Since then, the liberty to opt out has 
changed along all three dimensions that characterized the earlier doctrine. 
First, courts now frame the conflict as an attempt by parents to dictate the 
curriculum. Second, religion is very significant for the success of an 
opting-out claim, to the extent that secular justifications are readily 
dismissed. Third, courts now view public schools not as mere service 
providers, but as authoritative entities charged with governing the health 
and values of the population. 
Part III proposes a new approach to resolve opting-out disputes. This 
approach is based on a three-part test to assess whether a “family law” is 
in place. A family law should be: (1) general and articulable; (2) grounded 
in religion, ethics, or morality; and (3) perceived as binding by members 
of a particular family. This Part argues that the existence of a family law 
should trigger a liberty to opt out of aspects of public school education, 
but that this liberty is subject to some limiting principles. Finally, the 
 
 
 15. See infra Part III.B.  
 16. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Pierce, 268 U.S. 510. 
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Article applies the new proposal to past and future opting-out conflicts 
involving three types of family laws: religious, feminist, and vegetarian.  
I. THE CONFLICTING AFFILIATIONS OF CHILDREN 
Antigone had to choose. She could bury her beloved brother who had 
betrayed their country, or she could obey the command of the king to 
leave the traitor’s flesh to rot.17 Most children are simultaneously future 
adult citizens of the state and members of a family.18 At times these two 
paths merge in harmony. This Article is about the times when they do not. 
Such times have captured the imagination of dramatists, philosophers, 
political scientists, and jurists. Antigone and Hamlet are mythic 
representations of this concept of dual identity.19 Much like Antigone, 
Hamlet was commanded, albeit by a ghost, to remember his father’s death, 
a duty that conflicted with his duty as a citizen to obey the new king. 
Antigone and Hamlet remembered and lamented the loss of a beloved 
family member. And they both ended their lives performing their 
perceived family obligations. Hamlet killed the uncle who had killed his 
father; Antigone buried her dead brother. They both died shortly after. 
This Part shows that in scholarly debates regarding such conflicts 
between the two primary affiliations of children, two main positions have 
crystalized. Some scholars have favored the identity of the child as a 
future citizen of the liberal state. Others have favored the child’s familial 
identity. By examining each scholarly approach in turn, this Part 
establishes the important dichotomy between what I call the “Supremacy 
of the State” and the “Supremacy of the Family.” This dichotomy, as Part 
II will show, remains with us until this day. 
A. The Supremacy of the State  
The underlying assumption of those who view the state as supreme in 
conflicts involving the dual identity of children is that in the context of 
inculcating values, children are primarily citizens of the state and only 
 
 
 17. See SOPHOCLES, ANTIGONE, in THREE THEBAN PLAYS (Penguin Classics 2000); see also 
JUDITH BUTLER, ANTIGONE’S CLAIM (Columbia University Press 2000). 
 18. See, e.g., ALEXANDRE KOJÈVE, OUTLINE OF A PHENOMENOLOGY OF RIGHT 425–26 (2007); 
BRUCE ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 154 (1981); AMY GUTMANN, 
DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION (Princeton University Press 1987); see also Vivian E. Hamilton, Immature 
Citizens and the State, 2010 BYU L. REV. 1055, 1058 (arguing that “the state at best squanders 
opportunities to more effectively advance its ends with respect to immature citizens; and at worst, fails 
to meet its most basic obligations to them”).  
 19. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET: THE TEXTS OF 1603 AND 1623 (Ann Thompson & Neil 
Taylor eds., Arden Shakespeare 2006); SOPHOCLES, supra note 17. 
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secondarily family members. Under this view, the liberal state is entitled, 
and indeed obligated, to transmit certain values to children. Scholarship 
advocating this approach is found in both socialist and liberal traditions, 
although the two obviously disagree as to which values the state ought to 
instill in children.20 This Article examines scholars associated with the 
liberal tradition.  
Some liberal theorists have asserted that there are certain fundamental 
liberal values that children as citizens of the state must learn. Amy 
Gutmann’s Democratic Education is a representative text on this point.21 
Gutmann argues that all children, regardless of the wishes of parents, 
should develop the skills to make their own decisions about “the good 
life,” and that, accordingly, all children must receive an education that 
would develop critical deliberation skills.22 Even private schools, 
according to Gutmann, should be required to teach democratic values. 
States should also be compelled by the federal government to implement 
core values even against the will of the political majority.23  
Relatedly, Bruce Ackerman has maintained that lawmakers should 
prioritize the autonomy of children.24 According to Ackerman, children 
must acquire the power to make their own decisions.25 Ackerman thus 
supports a legal rule that would mandate exposing children to various 
conceptions of “the good.”26 Under his proposed regime, parents could 
express their own values when raising children, but would be required to 
send children to a “liberal school” that would ensure exposure to many 
conceptions of “the good.”27 No one, according to Ackerman, should be 
allowed to indoctrinate “an uncritical acceptance of any conception of the 
good life.”28  
Mary Anne Case has articulated a comparable approach with an 
emphasis on another key liberal value: gender equality. Case argues that 
“the equality of the sexes, and the instantiation of that equality in the 
repudiation of ‘fixed notions concerning the roles and abilities of males 
and females,’ are fundamental commitments on which all levels of 
 
 
 20. KOJÈVE, supra note 18. 
 21. GUTMANN, supra note 18. 
 22. Id.  
 23. Id. 
 24. ACKERMAN, supra note 18. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. at 44. 
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government in the United States must follow through.”29 Like Gutmann, 
Case proposes that the commitment to liberal education must not be 
limited to public education, and that “[n]ot only in public schools and 
government funded educational programs, but in state-licensed private 
schools and home schooling, [states] must ensure that girls and boys 
receive equal opportunity.”30 Case further argues that mandatory readings 
in school that challenge sex stereotyping should be viewed by courts as 
“constitutionally required to provide to both male and female students 
equal protection on grounds of sex.”31 All state-sponsored educational 
institutions, according to Case, are “required to refrain from promoting a 
message of inequality between men and women.”32  
Two significant threads unite the texts of Gutmann, Ackerman, and 
Case. First, all three scholars identify a liberal value that public and 
private educators must transmit or apply to children. For Gutmann and 
Ackerman that value is individual autonomy, with the educational goal of 
facilitating a child’s independent decisions about “the good life.”33 For 
Case, the value is gender equality, with the educational goal of promoting 
gender equality and eradicating sex stereotyping. Second, all three 
scholars agree that when the problem of dual identity arises and a child’s 
identity as a family-member conflicts with his or her identity as a future 
citizen, the latter should prevail. What is important for the purpose of this 
Article is that Gutmann, Ackerman, and Case agree that a parent’s wish to 
opt out of education about gender equality (Case) or autonomy 
(Ackerman, Gutmann) deserves no protection by state or federal courts. In 
times of conflict of dual-affiliation, under this view, the state is supreme. 
B. The Supremacy of the Family 
Others have disagreed, arguing that for the purpose of inculcating 
values, children are primarily family members and only secondarily 
citizens of the state. Consequently, under this view, the state should not be 
 
 
 29. Mary Anne Case, Feminist Fundamentalism on the Frontier Between Government and 
Family Responsibility for Children, 2 UTAH L. REV. 381, 382 (2009). See also James G. Dwyer, The 
Children We Abandon: Religious Exemptions to Child Welfare and Education Laws as Denials of 
Equal Protection to Children of Religious Objectors, 74 N.C. L. REV. 1321, 1326 (1996) (“[A] 
compelling legal argument against religious exemptions to child welfare and education laws is that 
they discriminate among groups of children, in the conferral of important state benefits, on an arbitrary 
and improper basis—namely, the religious beliefs of other persons.”). 
 30. Case, supra note 29, at 382. 
 31. Id. at 393. 
 32. Id. 
 33. As this Article points out, a child’s “autonomy” for liberal thinkers tends to mean departure 
from familial norms, more so than from the norms of the liberal state.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol90/iss2/3
  
 
 
 
 
2012] THE LAWMAKING FAMILY 371 
 
 
 
 
entitled to transmit values to children against the will of the parents. Such 
approaches may appear either within liberal reasoning or as an external 
critique of liberalism. For example, Stephen Gilles has argued from within 
liberalism for greater rights for religious families when the interests of 
parents conflict with those of the liberal state.34 According to Gilles, 
“[t]here are compelling reasons to give parents not only the right to 
transmit their values to their children, but also the right to reject schooling 
that promotes values contrary to their own.”35 Gilles argues that it is 
illegitimate for the state to promote some conceptions of “the good” over 
others through mandatory school programs.36 This argument for parental 
authority does not reject liberalism as a theory, but is based instead on 
liberal values such as tolerance and pluralism towards dissenting parents 
and families.37 
In contrast, Stephen Carter’s approach to the question of liberal 
education seems to come from outside liberal ideology. Liberal education, 
according to Carter, is simply the means that today’s “group in power” 
uses to indoctrinate the children “of the other side.”38 Values such as 
autonomy and gender equality represent the values of “the group in 
power.” The point is that, no matter which social group is “dominant” at 
any given time, using state institutions to inculcate the children of “the 
other side” is problematic.39 According to Carter, today’s liberal education 
can be just as totalitarian as it was when Protestant nativists in the 
nineteenth century were using public education to create a uniform way of 
thinking.40 
In sum, scholarly views on the dual identity of children can be roughly 
divided into two positions: while some scholars have maintained that the 
child’s identity as a future citizen of the liberal state should prevail over 
the child’s identity as a family member (the “Supremacy of the State” 
 
 
 34. Stephen G. Gilles, On Educating Children: A Parentalist Manifesto, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 937, 
938 (1996) (observing that “parental educational rights are both ill defined and vulnerable to unduly 
deferential judicial review of state educational regulation”). 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. at 938–39. 
 37. Id. at 940. 
 38. Stephen L. Carter, Parents, Religion, and Schools: Reflections on Pierce, 70 Years Later, 27 
SETON HALL L. REV. 1194, 1223–24 (1997) (“The purpose is clothed in the gentle language of 
preparing young people to be adult citizens of the republic, but the clothing should not distract us from 
the argument underneath: good adults are, by definition, those who think the way the dominant group 
does . . . .”). 
 39. Id. at 1224 (“[T]his truth is the same whether the dominant group is nativist Protestants in the 
nineteenth century, progressive intellectuals at the beginning of the twentieth, anti-Communist 
populists in the middle of this century, or theorists of liberalism today.”). 
 40. Id.  
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view), others have asserted that the child’s identity as a family member 
should prevail (the “Supremacy of the Family” view).41 We will now see 
how these two positions have played out in the jurisprudence of opting 
out. 
II. A SHIFT IN SUPREMACY: FROM THE FAMILY TO THE STATE 
The position of U.S. courts on opting-out conflicts has shifted 
dramatically over the twentieth century. In the early twentieth century, 
parents mostly prevailed in such conflicts, whereas today public schools 
typically prevail. The following chart maps the central features of this 
transition.  
FIGURE 1: THE SHIFTING JURISPRUDENCE OF OPTING OUT 
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This Part examines the historical progression from family supremacy to 
state supremacy in opting-out disputes.  
 
 
 41. Maxine Eichner has argued that neither the state nor parents should prevail in such conflicts. 
See Maxine Eichner, Who Should Control Children’s Education?: Parents, Children, and the State, 75 
U. CIN. L. REV. 1339, 1340 (2006) (“Instead, a vigorous liberal democracy must develop a framework 
for education that gives all of these interests some accommodation.”).  
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A. The Common-Law Era: The Supremacy of the Family  
Under our form of government, and at common law, the home is 
considered the keystone of the governmental structure. In this 
empire parents rule supreme during the minority of their children. 
—School Board Dist. No. 18 v. Thompson (1909)42 
In an opting-out dispute decided by the Supreme Court of Oklahoma in 
1909, the court described the home as a “keystone of the governmental 
structure.”43 This represents the prevalent position of common law courts 
at the time: when schools and parents disagreed in matters of education, 
the family was deemed supreme. A similar idea is manifested in Roscoe 
Pound’s 1916 article Individual Interests in the Domestic Relations. Pound 
writes: 
Parents may and do claim not merely the society of their children, 
as ministering a social pleasure, but the custody and control of 
them, especially while they are of tender years, and the power to 
dictate their training, prescribe their education and form their 
religious opinions. All these things are claimed, as it were, as a part 
of the parent’s personality.44 
Pound’s narrative captures the spirit of the era. Parents had the “power to 
dictate” the training of children, as well as to “prescribe their education 
and form their religious opinions.”45 This authority, as Pound writes, was 
understood as an essential part of the “parent’s personality.”46 In the 
common-law era, children were still understood primarily as family 
members. 
Three main characteristics appear in these early opting-out disputes. 
First, courts consistently understood the main issue in opting-out disputes 
to be whether a teacher or a school could prescribe the education of 
children, rather than whether the parents could dictate the curriculum. 
 
 
 42. Sch. Bd. Dist. No. 18 v. Thompson, 103 P. 578, 581 (Okla. 1909). 
 43. Id. 
 44. Roscoe Pound, Individual Interests in the Domestic Relations, 14 MICH. L. REV. 177, 181 
(1916).  
 45. Id.  
 46. Pound clarified that the interest of parents in children was by no means absolute. In “modern 
times,” he writes, courts balance the interests of the family—now understood as a “social 
institution”—with those of the state in securing and educating “well-bred citizens for the future.” Id.  
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Second, the success of a parental claim did not depend on its religious 
grounding. Third, courts generally perceived public schools as service 
providers rather than as governing agencies managing large student 
populations. I discuss each characteristic in turn. 
1. Main Principle: No State Intervention in the Family 
The first key characteristic of the common-law era relates to the 
framing of the conflict by courts. Common-law courts in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries decided several opting-out 
disputes involving topics such as dancing, cooking, housekeeping, book-
keeping, and geography. In contrast with contemporary courts who, as we 
will see, view opting-out challenges as parental attempts to interfere with 
the public school curriculum, these early courts interestingly understood 
the issue to be just the opposite: whether a school or a teacher could 
prescribe the education of a child. 
Consider a few examples. In Morrow v. Wood,47 a twelve-year-old 
child was punished for failing to attend geography lessons.48 The child’s 
father had instructed him not to study geography so that he could focus on 
reading, writing, and arithmetic.49 The court emphasized that it was a 
“fatal error” to think that “the authority of the teacher is paramount and 
controlling, and that she had the right to enforce obedience to her 
commands by corporal punishment.”50 The court articulated the proper 
balance between the parents and the teacher: 
We do not think [the teacher] had any such right or authority, and 
we can see no necessity for clothing the teacher with any such 
arbitrary power. We do not really understand that there is any 
recognized principle of law, nor do we think there is any rule of 
morals or social usage, which gives the teacher an absolute right to 
prescribe and dictate what studies a child shall pursue, regardless 
of the wishes or views of the parent, and, as incident to this, gives 
the right to enforce obedience even as against the orders of the 
parent.51 
 
 
 47. 35 Wis. 59 (1874). 
 48. Id. at 62. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 63–64.  
 51. Id. at 64 (emphasis added). The court further clarified that the father only “wished to exercise 
some control over the education of his son, and it is impossible to say that the choice of studies which 
he made was unreasonable or inconsistent with the welfare and best interest of his offspring.” Id. at 66.  
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This idea that a teacher cannot “prescribe” the curriculum appears in 
many other early opting-out disputes. In Hardwick v. Board of School 
Trustees,52 for example, parents sought to excuse their children from 
required dancing lessons.53 The parents argued that dancing was 
“offensive to [their] conscientious scruples and contrary to [their] religious 
beliefs and principles.”54 The court held that children could not “be 
compelled . . . to participate in the dancing exercises”55 as long as the 
survival of the state did not depend on this activity.56 In Rulison v. Post,57 
in the context of bookkeeping,58 the Illinois Supreme Court held that a 
school has “no power to prescribe the academic or collegiate course, nor 
the high school system, [and therefore] would have no power to compel 
pupils to pursue such a course under penalty of expulsion.”59 And in 
School Board Dist. No. 18 v. Thompson,60 a court held that a school 
wrongfully required students to participate in singing classes.61 The 
parents’ attempt to opt out of singing classes was characterized as a 
“reasonable selection.”62 The court explained that at common law, “the 
parent, and especially the father, was vested with supreme control over the 
child, including its education, and, except where modified by statute, that 
authority still exists in the parent.”63  
One of the main justifications for the supremacy of the family in these 
early cases was the “spirit of our free institutions.”64 As the Rulison court 
 
 
 52. 205 P. 48 (Cal. Ct. App. 1921). 
 53. Id. at 49–50. 
 54. Id. at 49. 
 55. Id. at 52. 
 56. Id. at 55 (discussing the importance of showing patriotism by saluting the flag and the 
government’s legitimate interest in requiring such an exhibition of patriotism).  
 57. 79 Ill. 567 (1875). 
 58. Id. A sixteen-year old student was expelled from school after she followed the will of her 
parents and refused to study bookkeeping. 
 59. Id. at 572. The school therefore “could not lawfully expel [the student] from the benefits and 
privileges of the school, for a refusal to comply with this requirement, and when they did so with 
force, it constituted a trespass.” Id. at 574.  
 60. 103 P. 578 (Okla. 1909). 
 61. Thompson, 103 P. at 582 (“The parent . . . has a right to make a reasonable selection from the 
prescribed course of study for his child to pursue, and this selection must be respected by the school 
authorities, as the right of the parent in that regard is superior to that of the school officers and the 
teachers.”). 
 62. Id.; see also State ex rel. Kelley v. Ferguson, 144 N.W. 1039, 1041 (Neb. 1914) (affirming a 
father’s “right . . . to make a reasonable selection from the prescribed studies for his child to pursue”).  
 63. Thompson, 103 P. at 579; see also State ex rel. Bowe v. Bd. of Educ. of City of Fond Du 
Lac., 23 N.W. 102, 103 (1885) (holding that a “rule or regulation requiring the pupil to bring up wood 
for use in the school-room was one which the board had no right to make and enforce”).  
 64. Rulison, 79 Ill. at 573. 
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emphasized in 1875, this spirit of freedom is absent in “despotic 
governments” where the state controls the education of children: 
 Parents and guardians are under the responsibility of preparing 
children intrusted to their care and nurture, for the discharge of their 
duties in after life. Law-givers in all free countries, and, with few 
exceptions, in despotic governments, have deemed it wise to leave 
the education and nurture of the children of the State to the direction 
of the parent or guardian. This is, and has ever been, the spirit of our 
free institutions.65  
This articulation of freedom, almost half a century before its constitutional 
affirmation in Meyer and Pierce, reflects a principle of non-intervention 
by the state in matters of education. Family authority in matters of 
education trumped the state’s interest in educating its citizens. Likewise, 
when a father wished that his twelve-year-old daughter not waste her time 
in cooking classes in State ex rel. Kelley v. Ferguson,66 the Nebraska 
Supreme Court rejected the school’s claim for authority.67 The court 
expressed some sympathy for inculcating ideals of citizenship by schools68 
but underscored the risk of governmental paternalism:  
All this [education about the values of citizenship] is commendable 
and must receive the sanction of every good citizen. But, in this age 
of agitation, such as the world has never known before, we want to 
be careful lest we carry the doctrine of governmental paternalism 
too far, for, after all is said and done, the prime factor in our scheme 
of government is the American home.69  
The “American home” was considered a sacred realm where, despite good 
intentions for the public welfare, “governmental paternalism” could not 
reach.70 As we will see, today courts embrace a different mode of liberal 
governance in which familial freedom to educate is often trumped by 
 
 
 65. Id.  
 66. 144 N.W. 1039 (Neb. 1914) (explaining that the father reasoned that “the time consumed by 
said class was almost a half day, thereby causing [her] to fall behind in her other studies for lack of 
time.”). 
 67. Id. at 1040. 
 68. Id. at 1043–44. The school district had argued that “industrial training is essential to the 
welfare of the public, and it is the function of the state to require courses to be given affording 
industrial training.” Id. at 1040.  
 69. Id. at 1044.  
 70. See also State ex rel. Sheibley v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 48 N.W. 393 (Neb. 1891) (holding that a 
father who objected to a child’s grammar studies was a better proxy for determining the happiness of 
his fifteen year old child). 
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state-mandated education about civic values and the health of future 
citizens. 
2. The Broad Scope of Protected Familial Interests 
Another surprising characteristic of the early opting-out cases is that 
parents could opt out on nearly any ground. So long as the parent had a 
“reasonable” justification, a decision to opt out from any school activity 
was generally respected. Unlike recent opting-out disputes, religion played 
little or no role in most of the early opting-out cases. In Morrow, for 
example, a father’s opposition to his son’s geography studies had nothing 
to do with religion.71 The father considered the study of geography “less 
necessary for his boy at that time than some other branches.”72 He wished 
his son to devote all his time to “orthography, reading, writing and 
arithmetic,” and the court endorsed this preference because it was not 
“unreasonable or inconsistent with the welfare and best interest of his 
offspring.”73 Similarly, in State ex rel. Sheibley,74 a father’s objection to 
his daughter’s grammar lessons was validated by the court. The only 
reason he provided was that it “was not taught in said school as he had 
been instructed when he went to school.”75 And in State ex rel. Bowe v. 
City of Fond Du Lac,76 a court considered a father justified for instructing 
his child, due to the child’s poor health, to violate a school requirement 
that each child carry a piece of wood to class for maintaining the 
classroom fire.77 
Especially telling on this point is Ferguson, in which a father sought to 
exempt his daughter from cooking classes. The court complimented the 
father for objecting to cooking classes and opined that “we do not think a 
case could be presented where a selection made by a parent would more 
 
 
 71. Morrow v. Wood, 35 Wis. 59 (1874). 
 72. Id. at 65 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 73. Id. at 65–66 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 74. 48 N.W. 393 (Neb. 1891). 
 75. Id. at 394 (internal quotation marks omitted). See also Trustees of Schools v. Van Allen, 87 
Ill. 303 (1877) (similarly holding that high school was not authorized to deny admissions of a student 
who had passed examination in all studies, except grammar, which his father did not desire him to 
study). In Thompson, it is not clear why the parents objected to singing classes—but no religious 
claims were discussed by the court. 
 76. 23 N.W. 102 (1885). 
 77. Id. at 104 (“[T]he rule or regulation requiring pupils to bring up wood for use in the school-
room was one which the board had no right to make and enforce. But if we are wrong in this view, the 
relation shows a most satisfactory excuse on the part of the boy for failing to conform to it.”). 
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clearly be a reasonable selection than the one attempted to be made in this 
case.”78 The court explained why the father’s justification was compelling: 
[A]t the time the disagreement arose the daughter was studying 
music, which required not less than two hours a day. If the relator 
desired to have his daughter study music, he had the unquestionable 
right to have her do so, and if he thought that the taking of lessons 
in music, in addition to the studies she was taking in school, as 
above set out, was all she was able to carry, then, if he had a right to 
make a selection at all, it must be conceded that it was reasonable 
for him to select the lesson in domestic science, which took 
substantially one-tenth of her entire school time, as the lesson to be 
dropped, in order that she might continue her music.79  
The father’s preference here was not motivated by religion, morality, or 
social convention—any of which might have led him to encourage the 
daughter’s cooking classes. Instead, the father preferred an unusual 
educational path out of his “desire[] to have his daughter study music.”80 
The court found this preference commendable. So we see that so long as 
parents provided some reasoning for keeping a child out of a class, courts 
recognized their authority to do so. 
In one case where religious faith was the ground for an opting-out 
request, the court held for the parents by generously interpreting “religion” 
to include any moral conviction of the parents. The court in Hardwick v. 
Board of School Trustees81 held that objecting parents need not prove that 
they belonged to any specific religious group. Choosing a course of 
education for a child “is as much a question of morals, which may concern 
the consciences of those who are not affiliated with any particular 
religious sect as well as of those who are active members of religious 
organizations opposed to that form of amusement or exercise.”82 The court 
validated the parents’ objection although they did not belong to a 
recognizable church. 
In stark opposition to more recent opting-out cases, common-law era 
courts encouraged parental picking and choosing from the public-school 
curriculum. So long as parents did not attempt to impose their individual 
preferences on other children, any reasonable justification as to how a 
child could benefit from parental restructuring of the curriculum was 
 
 
 78. State ex rel. Kelley v. Ferguson, 144 N.W. 1039, 1041 (Neb. 1914). 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id.  
 81. 205 P. 49 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1921). 
 82. Id. at 53. 
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welcomed and endorsed by courts. Religious liberty was only one among a 
variety of reasons parents could offer. This reflects a perception of the 
child as primarily a member of the family, and of the supremacy of the 
family. 
3. Conclusion: The Service-Providing State 
The State has provided the means, and brought them within the 
reach of all, to acquire the benefits of a common school education, 
but leaves it to parents and guardians to determine the extent to 
which they will render it available to the children under their 
charge. 
—Rulison v. Post (1875)83 
We have so far examined two aspects of the early opting-out cases. 
First, courts perceived the main legal issue in opting-out disputes to be 
whether teachers could “prescribe” the curriculum and disregard the 
“reasonable selection” of parents. Second, courts recognized a broad 
decision-making power of parents that was not limited to religious claims. 
The third salient characteristic of the common-law era is that courts cast 
the public school as a service provider to families. In case after case, 
judges reminded public school officials that their mandate is limited to 
managing the schools and providing services to families, and that they are 
not authorized to manage individual students.  
Rulison demonstrates this point. In deciding that a sixteen-year-old 
could not be required to participate in bookkeeping classes despite the 
contrary wish of her parents, the court explains: 
[i]n the performance of their duty in carrying the law into effect, the 
directors may prescribe proper rules and regulations for the 
government of the schools of their district, and enforce them. They 
may, no doubt, classify the scholars, regulate their studies and their 
deportment, the hours to be taught, besides the performance of other 
duties necessary to promote the success and secure the well-being 
of such schools.84 
The duty of school officials, as the court clarifies here, is to govern and 
ensure the well-being of the school itself. The emphasis here is on the 
institution, not the individual students, as the province of school 
 
 
 83. Rulison v. Post, 79 Ill. 567, 573 (1875). 
 84. Id. at 570–71. 
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governance. The student attends school as an exercise of an individual 
right and not as the duty of a citizen: 
[A]ll such rules and regulations must be reasonable, and calculated 
to promote the objects of the law—the conferring of such an 
education upon all, free of charge. The law having conferred upon 
each child of proper age the right to be taught the enumerated 
branches, any rule or regulation which, by its enforcement, would 
tend to hinder or deprive the child of this right can not be sustained. 
All rules must be adapted to the promotion and accomplishment of 
this great and paramount object of the law.85 
The object of the law, according to the Rulison court, is to confer the right 
to be educated upon a child. Accordingly, the school’s right to expel or 
suspend a student can be exercised “only for disobedient, refractory or 
incorrigibly bad conduct,”86 because: 
It is by the commission of one of these acts, alone, that the pupil can 
forfeit his right to the privileges of the school; and this forfeiture 
can only be enforced, and the right lost, after all other reasonable 
means have failed. Nor is the suspension or expulsion designed 
merely as a punishment of the child, but principally as a means of 
preserving order and the proper government of the school.87 
The only legitimate reason to expel or suspend a child, according to this 
court, is to preserve the order and government of the school. The child in-
and-of-herself was not the legitimate object of governance. Governing 
children was the domain of the family. Similar reasoning appears in 
Ferguson: 
[I]f the [father] desired that his little girl should take music lessons 
from a private instructor and devote an hour or two a day to that 
study, in lieu of the modern lesson of cooking in the public school, 
we are unable to see how excusing her from that lesson could have 
interfered with the discipline of the school.88 
So long as the “discipline of the school” was not injured by the student’s 
opting out of cooking class, school officials could not mandate her 
participation in those classes against the wishes of her father. Similarly, in 
Sheibley, the court explained that “[t]here is no good reason why the 
 
 
 85. Id. at 571. 
 86. Id.  
 87. Id.  
 88. State ex rel. Kelley v. Ferguson, 144 N.W. 1039, 1044 (Neb. 1914). 
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failure of one or more pupils to study one or more prescribed branches 
should result disastrously to the proper discipline, efficiency, and well-
being of the school.”89  
Schools in the common-law era were viewed as service providers 
whose authority stems from the delegation of parents. Thus, as long as all 
students have access to the service provided by the state, some can opt out 
of the full range of services. The Oklahoma Supreme Court quotes 
Blackstone for further support of this position: 
[The father] may also delegate part of his parental authority, during 
his life, to the tutor or schoolmaster of his child, who is then in loco 
parentis, and has such a portion of the power of the parent 
committed to his charge, viz., that of restraint and correction, as 
may be necessary to answer the purposes for which he is 
employed.90 
The school, according to Blackstone, derives its authority from the 
delegation of the father. Accordingly, 
it is idle to say the parent, by sending his child to school, impliedly 
clothes the teacher with that power, in a case where the parent 
expressly reserves the right to himself, and refuses to submit to the 
judgment of the teacher the question as to what studies his boy 
should pursue.91 
The school, under this theory, could act only within the scope of its 
delegation, and that scope was determined solely by the father.92 This, we 
will later see, is the opposite of contemporary opting-out cases where 
management, health, and education of the general population are inherent 
to public-school education. 
In sum, three key components typify opting-out disputes in the 
common-law era. First, courts framed the opting-out conflict as an 
intrusion into the parental domain of education. Second, the right to opt 
out was not limited to religious claims—any reasonable parental interest 
could be validated by courts. Third, courts viewed public schools as 
 
 
 89. State ex rel. Sheibley, 48 N.W. 393, 395 (Neb. 1891) (adding that “so long as the failure of 
the students thus excepted to study all the branches of the prescribed course does not prejudice the 
equal rights of other students, there is no cause for complaint.”). 
 90. Sch. Bd. Dist. No. 18 v. Thompson, 103 P. 578, 581 (Okla. 1909) (quoting Blackstone) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
 91. Id. 
 92. I will later return to the issue of how lawmaking authority is allocated in various lawmaking 
families. See infra Part III. 
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service providers vested only with the power to maintain order and 
discipline of the school—but not with the authority to manage individual 
students. The constitutional era, while formally recognizing the parents’ 
role in decision-making, began a period that slowly eroded the supremacy 
of the family. 
B. The Constitutional Era: The Supremacy of the State 
In Meyer v. Nebraska,93 decided in 1923, a school-teacher was 
prosecuted in the state of Nebraska for teaching German to a ten-year-old 
in violation of a statute that prohibited the teaching of “any subject to any 
person in any language other than the English language.”94 The Court 
struck down the statute, reasoning that the teacher’s right to teach German 
“and the right of parents to engage him so to instruct their children . . . are 
within the liberty of the [Fourteenth] [A]mendment.”95 The Meyer Court 
thus located a parental liberty interest in the Due Process Clause. 
Two years later, in Pierce v. Society of Sisters,96 the Court further 
elaborated the meaning of this new constitutional right.97 This time, the 
plaintiff, which provided Roman Catholic religious instruction and moral 
training, challenged a law that required every parent or guardian of a child 
between eight and sixteen years to send the child to public school. The 
Court struck down the law, announcing that: 
[t]he fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments in 
this Union repose excludes any general power of the state to 
standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction from 
public teachers only. The child is not the mere creature of the state; 
those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled 
with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional 
obligations.98 
 
 
 93. 262 U.S. 390 (1923). 
 94. Id. at 397. 
 95. Id. at 400 (emphasis added). The Court famously declared: 
[L]iberty . . . denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the 
individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful 
knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to 
the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at 
common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men. 
Id. at 399. 
 96. 268 U.S. 510 (1925). 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. at 535. 
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With these famous words, the Pierce Court declared the liberty interest of 
parents to include the right to choose private education over public 
education. More broadly, the Court clarified that the state cannot 
legitimately attempt to “standardize its children” because the child is not 
the “mere creature of the state.” Meyer and Pierce are considered 
landmark victories of individual rights against state coercion.99 Although 
they do not mention the constitutional right to privacy, they are considered 
its origins.100 
Meyer and Pierce were decided against the backdrop of what the Court 
viewed as totalitarianism. The Meyer Court differentiated constitutional 
democracies from Plato’s totalitarian vision of society.101 The Court 
emphasized that totalitarian ideas are “wholly different from those upon 
which our institutions rest; and it hardly will be affirmed that any 
Legislature could impose such restrictions upon the people of a state 
without doing violence to both letter and spirit of the Constitution.”102 The 
explicit message here is that liberal democracies protect parents from 
policies that attempt to shape children in a uniform way. Parents possess a 
liberty interest in the education of children. 
As Jed Rubenfeld has shown, in Meyer and Pierce “the state had gone 
much further in the effort . . . to ‘coerce uniformity.’”103 The meaning of 
the legislative ban on foreign languages in Meyer was “partially to ban 
‘foreign thinking’ and ‘foreign ideas’ from [students’] consciousness.”104 
The Court thus responded to “[t]he threat of the state using the public 
schools to inculcate one acceptable way of thinking—‘our’ way, as 
opposed to ‘foreign’ ways.”105 In Pierce, the threat of totalitarianism was 
even more immediate because the state had prohibited all private 
 
 
 99. But see Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, “Who Owns the Child?”: Meyer and Pierce and the 
Child as Property, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 995, 997 (1992) (arguing that Meyer and Pierce “were 
animated . . . by another set of values—a conservative attachment to the patriarchal family, to a class-
stratified society, and to a parent’s private property rights in his children and their labor”). 
 100. See, e.g., Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARV. L. REV. 737, 743 (1989). 
 101. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 401–02 (“Plato suggested a law which should provide: ‘That the wives of 
our guardians are to be common, and their children are to be common, and no parent is to know his 
own child, nor any child his parent . . . . The proper officers will take the offspring of the good parents 
to the pen or fold, and there they will deposit them with certain nurses who dwell in a separate quarter; 
but the offspring of the inferior, or of the better when they chance to be deformed, will be put away in 
some mysterious, unknown place, as they should be.’”). 
 102. Id. at 402. 
 103. Rubenfeld, supra note 100, at 786; see also Alice Ristroph & Melissa Murray, 
Disestablishing the Family, 119 YALE L.J. 1236, 1265 (2010) (“Meyer may be read to adopt the kind 
of antitotalitarian argument for institutional and ideological diversity.”). 
 104. Rubenfeld, supra note 100, at 786–87. 
 105. Id. at 787. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
384 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 90:363 
 
 
 
education.106 The anti-totalitarian underpinning of the liberty interest 
announced in Meyer and Pierce is crucial to understanding contemporary 
opting-out disputes. 
With these cases, the Supreme Court appeared to announce a broad 
liberty interest for parents. But over the course of what I call the 
“Constitutional Era,” lower courts interpreted this principle in ways that 
narrowed its applications. 
As illustrated in Figure 1 above,107 there are three key components to 
the opting-out disputes of the constitutional era. First, in contrast with the 
common-law era, courts today typically understand the main issue to be 
whether a parent can prescribe the school curriculum. Second, in 
contemporary opting-out disputes, parental requests that are not based on 
religious liberty are generally less successful. Third, unlike the early cases 
where courts viewed public schools as service providers, today courts 
view public schools as autonomous entities in charge of governing student 
populations and producing future generations of citizens. 
1. Main Principle: No Family Intervention in the State 
Public education in the United States has undergone a process of 
secularization in the twentieth century.108 It is therefore unsurprising that 
many opting-out disputes in the past four decades have involved religious 
objections to mandatory programs and policies. The most well-known of 
these challenges is Wisconsin v. Yoder.109 In Yoder, parents who practiced 
the Amish and Mennonite religions were convicted of violating the state’s 
compulsory public-school attendance law.110 The parents sought to opt out 
of public education, arguing that mandatory public-school education past 
the eighth grade violated their religious beliefs and threatened their entire 
religious way of life.111 The Court accepted the state’s educational 
 
 
 106. Id.; see also Carter, supra note 38 (arguing that Meyer and Pierce represent an implicit 
argument about social contract: parents can freely educate their children about religion because they 
have never delegated that right to the state).  
 107. See supra Part II.A.  
 108. See, e.g., KENT GREENAWALT, DOES GOD BELONG IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS? (Princeton 
University Press, 2005); Marc O. DeGirolami, The Problem of Religious Learning, 49 B.C. L. REV. 
1213, 1217 (2008) (“[B]y the mid-twentieth century, the conviction that Protestant Christianity was the 
exclusive wellspring of rectitude had quite properly been by and large repudiated, at least by the 
Supreme Court. And yet a robust civic and moral education remained one of the public schools’ 
raisons d’être.”); DAVID B. TYACK, THE ONE BEST SYSTEM: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN URBAN 
EDUCATION (1974). 
 109. 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. at 221. 
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goals,112 but held that the Amish values of reliability, self-reliance, and 
dedication to work can indeed prepare schoolchildren for productive adult 
citizenship.113 
Yoder is in the tradition of the Supreme Court’s broad articulation of 
the right to opt out, but, like Meyer and Pierce, Yoder has been narrowly 
construed by later courts. Parents and families who have attempted to rely 
on this case have mostly failed. Since Yoder, parents have sought to opt 
out in two primary educational areas: (1) health and sexuality, and 
(2) social values. In a majority of these cases, familial opting-out 
challenges under the First and the Fourteenth Amendments, both religious 
and nonreligious, have been unsuccessful. 
a. Health and Sexuality 
Struggles to exempt a child from classes or programs involving health 
or sexuality have been characterized by courts as attempts to prescribe the 
public-school curriculum. For example, in Brown v. Hot, Sexy & Safer 
Productions,114 the parents of high-school students complained when their 
children attended a mandatory school-wide HIV-awareness program.115 
The First Circuit held that parents cannot “dictate the curriculum” in 
public schools,116 and that the right to direct the upbringing of children is 
violated only by “foreclosing the opportunity of individuals and groups to 
choose a different path of education.”117 The court distinguished 
mandatory HIV education from the claims at issue in Meyer and Pierce: 
We think it is fundamentally different for the state to say to a 
parent, “You can’t teach your child German or send him to a 
parochial school,” than for the parent to say to the state, “You can’t 
teach my child subjects that are morally offensive to me.” The first 
 
 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. at 224–25 (“There is nothing in this record to suggest that the Amish qualities of 
reliability, self-reliance, and dedication to work would fail to find ready markets in today’s society. 
Absent some contrary evidence supporting the State’s position, we are unwilling to assume that 
persons possessing such valuable vocational skills and habits are doomed to become burdens on 
society should they determine to leave the Amish faith . . . .”). 
 114. 68 F.3d 525 (1st Cir. 1995). 
 115. Id. at 529. The parents invoked “their privacy right to direct the upbringing of their children 
and educate them in accord with their own views,” and their children claimed that the sexually explicit 
nature of the event humiliated and intimidated them. Id. at 529, 532. 
 116. Id. at 533 (“The Meyer and Pierce cases, we think, evince the principle that the state cannot 
prevent parents from choosing a specific educational program . . . . We do not think, however, that this 
freedom encompasses a fundamental constitutional right to dictate the curriculum at the public school 
to which they have chosen to send their children.”). 
 117. Id. 
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instance involves the state proscribing parents from educating their 
children, while the second involves parents prescribing what the 
state shall teach their children.118  
The logic here is crucial. The court holds that the state cannot “proscribe” 
parents from educating their children, and parents cannot “prescribe” what 
the state “shall teach their children.” The court explains: 
If all parents had a fundamental constitutional right to dictate 
individually what the schools teach their children, the schools 
would be forced to cater a curriculum for each student whose 
parents had genuine moral disagreements with the school’s choice 
of subject matter. We cannot see that the Constitution imposes such 
a burden on state educational systems, and accordingly find that the 
rights of parents as described by Meyer and Pierce do not 
encompass a broad-based right to restrict the flow of information in 
the public schools.119 
The court wishes to avoid schools having to “cater the curriculum” to each 
student whose parents disagree. But it is important that the parents in this 
case did not seek to dictate or cater the school curriculum for other 
children: they only sought to exempt their own children from parts of the 
curriculum. They were attempting what this Article calls an “opt out.” 
Nonetheless, the recurring theme in many such cases is that opposing 
parents seek “to restrict the flow of information in the public schools” and 
“to dictate the curriculum.”120 
This is a fascinating reversal of the opting-out cases: in the early cases, 
schools that did not accommodate parental opting-out requests were 
criticized by courts for prescribing the curriculum. Now the roles have 
flipped. The protective sword of Meyer and Pierce has turned on parents. 
This reversal is also apparent in Leebaert v. Harrington,121 where a father 
sought to excuse a child in the seventh grade from mandatory health-
education classes.122 The school refused and a lawsuit followed.123 The 
Second Circuit held for the school,124 following the First Circuit’s position 
that parents do not have “a fundamental constitutional right to dictate the 
 
 
 118. Id. at 533–34 (emphasis added). 
 119. Id. at 534. 
 120. Id. 
 121. 332 F.3d 134 (2d Cir. 2003).  
 122. Id. at 137 (noting the father argued that, “being sufficiently educated in health, sex, and 
behavioral issues, [I] feel it is more appropriate that as they enter adolescence I handle this facet of my 
children’s personal growth at home.”).  
 123. Id.  
 124. Id. at 145.  
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curriculum at the public school to which they have chosen to send their 
children.”125 The court explains: 
Meyer, Pierce, and their progeny do not begin to suggest the 
existence of a fundamental right of every parent to tell a public 
school what his or her child will and will not be taught . . . . 
[R]ecognition of such a fundamental right—requiring a public 
school to establish that a course of instruction objected to by a 
parent was narrowly tailored to meet a compelling state interest 
before the school could employ it with respect to the parent’s 
child—would make it difficult or impossible for any public school 
authority to administer school curricula responsive to the overall 
educational needs of the community and its children.126 
In contrast with the common-law era cases, the court vests the school with 
decision-making power regarding the “overall educational needs of the 
community and its children.”127 Leebaert and Hot, Sexy & Safer 
Productions exemplify the current narrow interpretation of Meyer, Pierce, 
and Yoder. 
Parents have also failed in several efforts to opt out of health-related 
surveys. In Fields v. Palmdale,128 elementary school children participated 
in a survey that included topics such as the frequency of “thinking about 
having sex” and “about touching other peoples’ private parts.”129 The 
Ninth Circuit framed the issue as “whether the parents have a 
constitutional right to exclusive control over the introduction and flow of 
sexual information to their children,”130 and held that they do not.131 
Parents may not prescribe the curriculum,132 and “[s]chools cannot be 
expected to accommodate the personal, moral or religious concerns of 
every parent.”133 A public school can provide students “with whatever 
 
 
 125. Id. at 141 (quoting Hot, Sexy & Safer Prods., 68 F.3d at 533–34) (internal citations omitted) 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 126. Id. at 141. 
 127. Id. 
 128. 427 F.3d 1197 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 129. Id. at 1200.  
 130. Id. at 1203. 
 131. Id. (“[N]o court has ever held that parents have a specific fundamental right ‘to control the 
upbringing of their children by introducing them to matters of and relating to sex in accordance with 
their personal and religious values and beliefs.”). 
 132. Id. at 1205–06 (“Meyer, Pierce, and their progeny ‘evince the principle that the state cannot 
prevent parents from choosing a specific educational program,’ but they do not afford parents a right to 
compel public schools to follow their own idiosyncratic views as to what information the schools may 
dispense.”). 
 133. Id. at 1206. 
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information it wishes to provide, sexual or otherwise, when and as [it] 
determines that it is appropriate to do so.”134 The Ninth Circuit concluded 
that “the right to limit what public schools or other state actors may tell 
their children regarding sexual matters, is not encompassed within the 
Meyer-Pierce right to control their children’s upbringing and 
education.”135 Similarly, in C.N. v. Ridgewood Board of Education,136 
parents challenged their children’s participation in a survey involving 
issues such as drug and alcohol use, sexual activity, suicide, and personal 
associations. The court held that a survey, even if involuntary, is not 
unconstitutional because it did not “strike at the heart of parental decision-
making.”137 
Parents have also repeatedly failed in challenges to school-sponsored 
birth-control programs. For example, Parents United for Better Schools v. 
Philadelphia Board of Education138 involved a condom-distribution 
program that addressed the concern that “adolescent pregnancy, sexually 
transmitted diseases, and HIV infection are epidemic among school age 
youth.”139 Parents in this case had the choice to opt their child out of the 
program,140 but students whose parents did not actively do so were 
supplied with condoms. The parents claimed that the policy violated their 
right to direct the upbringing of their children.141 But students today are 
primarily understood to be citizens of the state, and the goal of the school 
is to make them happier and healthier. The Third Circuit concluded that 
“the policy neither coerces parental or student participation nor offends the 
rights of parents to direct the care and custody of their children.”142 
There was no opt-out provision in the condom-distribution program 
challenged by the parents in Curtis v. School Committee of Falmouth.143 
The court concluded that the condom-distribution program was “in all 
 
 
 134. Id.  
 135. Id. at 1207.  
 136. 430 F.3d 159 (3d Cir. 2005). 
 137. Id. at 184–85 (“While the Supreme Court has extended constitutional protection to parental 
decisions regarding certain matters, our review of these cases prompts us to conclude that the decision 
whether to permit a middle or high school student to participate in a survey of this type is not a matter 
of comparable gravity.”) (citation omitted). 
 138. 148 F.3d 260 (3d Cir. 1998). 
 139. Id. at 262 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 140. Id. at 264. 
 141. Id. at 274. The school board’s policy stated that “[t]he Board of Education firmly believes 
that successful pursuit of the mission of promoting a healthy lifestyle for all adolescents depends upon 
the cooperation of a broad spectrum of the Philadelphia community, including schools, families, 
religious institutions, health care providers, social service agencies, businesses, government, and 
media.” Id. at 263 (quoting Policy Number 123, “Adolescent Sexuality”). 
 142. Id. at 262. 
 143. 652 N.E.2d 580 (Mass. 1995).  
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respects voluntary and in no way intrudes into the realm of constitutionally 
protected rights [and that] no threshold demonstration of a coercive burden 
has been made.”144 The court clarified that “[t]he type of interference 
necessary to support a claim based on an alleged violation of parental 
liberty appears to be that which causes a coercive or compulsory effect on 
the claimants’ rights.”145 Condom-distribution programs are viewed as 
voluntary since the program does not actually require the students to 
obtain condoms.146 Thus, although religious or moral sensibilities of 
parents may be offended, the coercion standard is not met because 
“parents are free to instruct their children not to participate.”147 
By the end of the twentieth century, the perception of children flipped. 
Through the lens of this reversal in courts’ responses to opting-out 
disputes, it seems that minors are now viewed primarily as future citizens 
and secondarily as family members. Parents have very limited opting-out 
powers. Teaching students about HIV, mandating health surveys, and 
distributing contraceptives are all within the current mandate of public-
school education. 
b. Social Values 
Two types of opting-out conflicts involve what we might call “social 
values.” First, school dress codes and grooming policies, which are often 
justified by schools as minimizing socioeconomic gaps and reducing drop-
out rates, have been challenged by parents.148 Second, teaching liberal 
values such as gender equality and same-sex marriage in the public-school 
setting has been the source of intense conflicts between schools and 
dissenting parents. 
 i. Opting Out of Dress Codes and Grooming 
Parents have unsuccessfully attempted to exempt children from dress 
codes and grooming policies. Such was the case in the Fifth Circuit’s 
 
 
 144. Id. at 583. 
 145. Id. at 585.  
 146. Id. at 586 (“The students are not required to seek out and accept the condoms, read the 
literature accompanying them, or participate in counseling regarding their use. In other words, the 
students are free to decline to participate in the program.”). 
 147. Id.; see also Doe v. Irwin, 615 F.2d 1162 (6th Cir. 1980) (upholding a clinic’s programs, in a 
case brought by the parents of a sixteen year-old female who received contraceptives from a public 
family planning clinic).  
 148. See, e.g., Littlefield v. Forney, 268 F.3d 275 (5th Cir. 2001). 
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decision in Littlefield v. Forney,149 where parents challenged a district-
wide mandatory uniform policy that had an opt-out provision only for 
families “with ‘bona fide’ religious or philosophical objections to the 
wearing of a uniform.”150 Parents claimed that the narrowness of the 
provision violated their fundamental right to control the upbringing and 
education of their children.151 The court validated the uniform policy 
because it furthers “the legitimate goals of improving student safety, 
decreasing socioeconomic tensions, increasing attendance, and reducing 
drop-out rates.”152 Similarly, in Blau v. Fort Thomas Public School 
District,153 a father and his daughter challenged a middle school dress 
code.154 The father claimed that the code violates his right to control the 
dress of his child, and his daughter explained that she wanted to wear 
clothes that “look nice on [her], that she feel[s] good in, and that express 
her individuality”.155 The Sixth Circuit reiterated the idea that parents 
cannot prescribe the public school curriculum: 
While parents may have a fundamental right to decide whether to 
send their child to a public school, they do not have a fundamental 
right generally to direct how a public school teaches their child. 
Whether it is the school curriculum, the hours of the school day, 
school discipline, the timing and content of examinations, the 
individuals hired to teach at the school, the extracurricular activities 
offered at the school or, as here, a dress code, these issues of public 
education are generally “committed to the control of state and local 
authorities.”156  
This language is especially helpful for understanding the current role of 
public schools. The parents’ right to direct the upbringing of children, 
according to the Sixth Circuit, ends when parents decide to send their child 
to public school. Thus, efforts of parents to opt out of dress codes and 
grooming policies usually fail as an intervention in the prerogative of 
public schools.157 
 
 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. at 281. 
 151. Id. at 282.  
 152. Id. at 291. 
 153. 401 F.3d 381 (6th Cir. 2005). 
 154. Id. at 385 (The dress code was designed to “create unity, strengthen school spirit and pride, 
and focus . . . attention upon learning and away from distractions.”).  
 155. Id. (alterations in original). 
 156. Id. at 395–96 (emphasis added). 
 157. See id.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol90/iss2/3
  
 
 
 
 
2012] THE LAWMAKING FAMILY 391 
 
 
 
 
There are exceptions, however. In a telling contrast with Blau, the Fifth 
Circuit recently held for parents in a religious challenge to a dress code in 
A.A. v. Needville Independent School District.158 A Native American 
family challenged a sex-based grooming policy that required boys to wear 
their hair short.159 The boy and his parents wanted the boy to wear his hair 
in two long braids.160 The Fifth Circuit granted the family’s opting-out 
request because the child “demonstrated a sincere religious belief in 
wearing his hair uncovered—visibly long.”161 The court dismissed the 
school’s hygienic and safety concerns,162 and reminded the school district 
that elementary school, “even in its most authoritarian form, is neither a 
military operation nor an incarceration facility.”163 The court conceded 
that the identity of boys as future citizens justifies a strict grooming code, 
but noted that there are exceptional cases in which a child’s identity as a 
member of a religious community will prevail. The family succeeded in its 
free exercise claims under state law.164  
Not all successful parental challenges involve religious grounds. 
Another case regarding teen sexuality and gender expression was decided 
recently by the Third Circuit in Miller v. Mitchell.165 Here, a district 
attorney presented teens suspected of “sexting” with the choice either to 
attend an educational program on gender and sexual expression or to face 
felony child pornography charges.166 One of the goals of the educational 
program was to educate girls about the dangers of female promiscuity.167 
The mother of one of the teens objected and sought to opt out of this 
program, claiming that it “contradict[s] the [feminist] beliefs she wishes to 
 
 
 158. 611 F.3d 248 (5th Cir. 2010). 
 159. Id. at 253. 
 160. Id. at 254.  
 161. Id. at 262 (emphasis in original). The court decided the case on state free exercise grounds 
only, under a strict scrutiny test. Id. at 272. 
 162. Id. at 268–69 (“[T]he District does not dispute that A.A.’s hair is kept clean, nor does it 
explain why its ‘one braid down the back’ exemption would foster hygiene as compared to two braids 
. . . . To the extent A.A.’s long hair poses a cognizable safety concern, it is of course far from those 
associated with a knife of any size or shape.”). 
 163. Id. at 271.  
 164. See id. at 272. The court did not address the constitutional claims because the holding under 
Texas law provided a non-constitutional basis sufficient to support its decision. 
 165. 598 F.3d 139 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 166. Id. at 144.  
 167. Id. (“The education program was divided into a Female Group and Male Group. The ‘Female 
Group’ syllabus lists among its objectives that the participants ‘gain an understanding of what it means 
to be a girl in today’s society, both advantages and disadvantages.’ In the first session, students are 
assigned to write ‘a report explaining why you are here,’ ‘[w]hat you did,’ ‘[w]hy it was wrong,’ ‘[d]id 
you create a victim? If so, who?,’ and how their actions “affect[ed] the victim[,] [t]he school[, and] the 
community.’”) (alterations in original). 
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instill in her daughter.”168 She particularly objected to the education 
program’s lessons about the moral wrongfulness of her daughter’s 
actions.169 The court agreed that the district attorney “impermissibly 
usurped and violated [the mother’s] fundamental right to raise her child 
without undue state interference.”170 One explanation for this exceptional 
decision is that the educational program was initiated and administered by 
a district attorney. Because criminal prosecutors are not typically 
authorized to educate the public, the district attorney’s actions were 
viewed by the Third Circuit as impermissibly coercive. 
These two exceptional parental victories involved school attempts to 
normalize teen gender expression. In both cases the circuit courts informed 
public officials that they had overstepped their authority. Such cases 
represent the kind of recognition and validation of religious and secular 
family laws proposed and discussed in Part III. 
 ii. Opting Out of Liberal Education  
Mandatory education about liberal values has generated intense conflict 
between schools and parents. In the well-known case of Mozert v. 
Hawkins County Board of Education,171 students were required to use a set 
of reading textbooks designed to help them “develop positive values” and 
“learn to become good citizens in their school, community, and 
society.”172 Students who refused to read the required books were 
suspended.173 Several parents sued, claiming that the readings involved 
materials that contradicted their religious convictions.174 One father 
objected to “[gender] role reversal or role elimination, particularly 
biographical material about women who have been recognized for 
achievements outside their homes.”175 Another complained about 
 
 
 168. Id. at 150. 
 169. Id.  
 170. Id. at 151 (“An essential component of Jane Doe’s right to raise her daughter—the 
‘responsibility to inculcate moral standards, religious beliefs, and elements of good citizenship,’—was 
interfered with by the District Attorney’s actions. While it may have been constitutionally permissible 
for the District Attorney to offer this education voluntarily . . . he was not free to coerce attendance by 
threatening prosecution.”) (citation omitted).  
 171. 827 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1987) (reversing the district court’s decision that the reading 
requirement violated the constitutional rights of the objecting parents and students). 
 172. Id. at 1060. The readings were executed under a requirement of a Tennessee statute to 
include “character education” in the curricula. TENN. CODE ANN. § 49-6-1007 (2009).  
 173. Mozert, 827 F.2d at 1060.  
 174. The plaintiffs did not belong to a particular church or denomination, but they considered 
themselves to be born again Christians. The sides agreed that their beliefs were sincere “and that 
certain passages in the reading texts offend[ed] those beliefs.” Id. at 1061.  
 175. Id. at 1062. 
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“passages that encourage children to make moral judgments about whether 
it is right or wrong to kill animals.”176 The Mozert court denied the opt-out 
requests, and underscored the key role of public schools in preparing 
children for adult citizenship.177 The court held that the readings are not 
coercive,178 and that “the evil prohibited by the Free Exercise Clause [is] 
. . . governmental compulsion either to do or refrain from doing an act 
forbidden or required by one’s religion, or to affirm or disavow a belief 
forbidden or required by one’s religion.”179 
The First Circuit reached a similar result in Parker v. Hurley,180 a case 
involving readings about families that are not based on heterosexual 
marriages.181 Some parents sought to opt out of those readings,182 alleging 
that they “indoctrinate young children into the concept that homosexuality 
and homosexual relationships or marriage are moral and acceptable 
behavior.”183 But the court again asserted that parents cannot prescribe the 
public school curriculum.184 As in Mozert, the Parker court validated the 
supremacy of the state by clarifying that it is legitimate for the state to 
“attempt to inculcate values by instruction,”185 and that it is the role of 
public educators to prepare students for citizenship.186 
In sum, a conceptual shift in the opting-out jurisprudence of courts has 
occurred. In the common-law era, the family was considered supreme and 
could therefore opt out of undesired aspects of public school education. In 
 
 
 176. Id.  
 177. Id. at 1060, 1071 (“critical reading is an essential skill which . . . children must develop in 
order to . . . function as effective participants in modern society . . . . Teaching students about complex 
and controversial social and moral issues is just as essential for preparing public school students for 
citizenship and self-government as inculcating in the students the habits and manners of civility.”). 
 178. Id. at 1065–66. 
 179. Id. at 1066 (concluding that no compulsion existed in this case). 
 180. 514 F.3d 87 (1st Cir. 2008). 
 181. Id. The following books were contested by the parents: ROBERT SKUTCH & LAURA 
NIENHAUS, WHO’S IN A FAMILY? (Tricycle Press 1997) (describing various kinds of families, 
including same-sex families); NANCY GARDEN, MOLLY’S FAMILY (Farrar, Straus & Giroux 2004) 
(teaching about different kinds of families); LINDA DE HAAN & STERN NIJLAND, KING AND KING 92–
93 (2003) (telling the story of a prince who is ordered to find a princess, but eventually falls in love 
with and marries a prince). 
 182. The parents invoked the right to privacy, the right to raise their children, and the free exercise 
of religion. They also argued that defendants’ conduct violated MASS GEN. LAWS ch. 71, § 32A, a 
statute which requires that parents be given notice and an opportunity to exempt their children from 
curriculum which “primarily involves human sexual education or human sexuality issues.” Parker, 
514 F.3d at 92. 
 183. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 184. Id. at 103.  
 185. Id. at 105.  
 186. Id. at 95 (citing Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681–85 (1986)). 
Therefore, in Massachusetts, “it is entirely rational for . . . schools to educate their students regarding 
that recognition [of same sex marriages].” Id. 
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the constitutional era, by contrast, the law has flipped. Despite some 
exceptions discussed above,187 in conflicts involving health education, sex 
education, dress codes, grooming, and education about social values, 
courts have generally denied familial opting-out requests.  
2. The Narrow Scope of Protected Familial Interests 
A way of life, however virtuous and admirable, may not be 
interposed as a barrier to reasonable state regulation of education if 
it is based on purely secular considerations . . . . 
—Wisconsin v. Yoder (1972)188 
One of the indications of the supremacy of the state in the 
constitutional era is the significant narrowing of the scope of protected 
parental interests. In contrast with the common-law era where we saw a 
broad range of protected familial interests, an important distinction 
crystalized in the constitutional era: secular and religious justifications of 
dissenting families are now treated differently. Courts time and time again 
have clarified that secular convictions of parents deserve less 
constitutional protection than do religious ones.189 So whereas the success 
of both religious and secular claims has significantly declined in the 
constitutional era, secular objections have fared worse.  
Opting-out disputes that are grounded in religion usually involve a 
combination of Free Exercise and Due Process claims.190 In such cases, 
courts have construed Yoder quite narrowly, placing considerable weight 
on the Court’s finding that the “entire way of life” of religious families 
was threatened by Wisconsin’s education policy.191 In Mozert, the Sixth 
Circuit dismissed opting-out requests from mandatory readings by 
 
 
 187. See A.A. v. Needville Indep. Sch. Dist., 611 F.3d 248, 268–69 (5th Cir. 2010); Miller v. 
Mitchell, 598 F.3d 139 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 188. 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972).  
 189. Cf. id. at 216 (“Thus, if the Amish asserted their claims because of their subjective evaluation 
and rejection of the contemporary secular values accepted by the majority, much as Thoreau rejected 
the social values of his time and isolated himself at Walden Pond, their claims would not rest on a 
religious basis. Thoreau’s choice was philosophical and personal rather than religious, and such belief 
does not rise to the demands of the Religion Clauses.”). 
 190. Courts have also dismissed several attempts to raise the level of scrutiny based on the hybrid 
nature of Fourteenth and First Amendment claims. See Michael E. Lechliter, Note, The Free Exercise 
of Religion and Public Schools: The Implications of Hybrid Rights on the Religious Upbringing of 
Children, 103 MICH. L. REV. 2209 (2005); but see Herndon v. Chapel Hill-Carrboro Bd. of Educ., 89 
F.3d 174 (4th Cir. 1996) (adopting the hybrid theory and dismissing a secular claim based on the 
rational basis test). 
 191. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 216. 
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distinguishing the plaintiff parents from the parents in Yoder.192 The court 
explained that whereas in Yoder the parents faced a “very real threat [of] 
undermining the Amish community and religious practice as they exist 
today,”193 here “[n]o such threat exists.”194 Likewise, in Hot, Sexy & Safer 
Productions, the First Circuit found that a “one-time compulsory 
attendance at the [HIV education] Program” did not threaten the dissenting 
families’ “entire way of life.”195 In Leebaert, the Second Circuit also 
distinguished a father’s request to opt out of health education from the 
claims of the parents in Yoder:  
[B]ecause of the comparative breadth of the plaintiffs’ claim in 
Yoder, we do not think that [the plaintiff’s] free exercise claim is 
governed by that decision: He has not alleged that his community’s 
entire way of life is threatened by [his child’s] participation in the 
mandatory health curriculum. [He] does not assert that there is an 
irreconcilable Yoder-like clash between the essence of [his] 
religious culture and the mandatory health curriculum that he 
challenges.196 
Similarly, in Parker, the court held that plaintiffs’ entire “way of life” was 
not significantly endangered when their children were exposed to same-
sex relationships through reading in public school.197 The failure of these 
attempts to opt out reflects the high threshold to which courts have held 
plaintiffs, even those with religious claims, in the last four decades. 
Secular claims are usually brought solely on Due Process grounds, and 
have fared even worse than religious claims. Indeed, as highlighted above, 
almost all secular opting-out challenges after Yoder have been dismissed 
by courts.198 In Herndon v. Chapel Hill-Carrboro Board of Education,199 
for example, the Fourth Circuit upheld a high-school’s requirement to 
 
 
 192. Mozert v. Hawkins Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058, 1067 (6th Cir. 1987) (reasoning that 
Yoder “rested on such a singular set of facts that we do not believe [the decision] can be held to 
announce a general rule that exposure without compulsion to act, believe, affirm or deny creates an 
unconstitutional burden.”). 
 193. Id. (quoting Yoder, 406 U.S. at 218) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 194. Id. 
 195. Brown v. Hot, Sexy & Safer Prods., Inc., 68 F.3d 525, 539 (1st Cir. 1995).  
 196. Leebaert v. Harrington, 332 F.3d 134, 144–45 (2d Cir. 2003) (emphasis added) (“[Plaintiff] 
asserts that the mandatory health curriculum conflicts with his belief that ‘drugs and tobacco are [not] 
proper subjects that I want my son’s school to teach’ and his view that ‘sex before marriage is . . . 
something I do not want my sons to be involved in.’ [Plaintiff’s] ‘free exercise claim is [thus] 
qualitatively distinguishable from that alleged in Yoder.’”) (alterations in original) (citation omitted). 
 197. See Parker v. Hurley, 514 F.3d 87, 100 (1st Cir. 2008).  
 198. See supra Part II.B.1. 
 199. 89 F.3d 174 (4th Cir. 1996). 
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perform community service. The court held that a community service 
requirement “does not intrude on the students’ freedom from involuntary 
servitude, their right to privacy, or their parents’ right to direct their 
upbringing and education,”200 and reasoned that “[e]xcept when the 
parents’ interest includes a religious element . . . the Court has declared 
with equal consistency that reasonable regulation by the state is 
permissible.”201 Other courts have dismissed secular claims without 
explicitly invoking the hierarchy between religious and secular claims. In 
Blau, for example, the Sixth Circuit easily dismissed a father’s attempt to 
exempt his daughter from a school dress code when it inhibited her 
“ability to wear clothing that she likes.”202 Even in the exceptional case 
where the Third Circuit upheld a parent’s secular-feminist case, the court’s 
reasoning reflects that the perceived coerciveness of the program was in 
large part connected to it being offered as an alternative to criminal 
prosecution.203 
Part III criticizes this hierarchy between secular and religious “ways of 
life” and offers a new way to articulate familial liberties. 
3. Conclusion: The Governing State 
The role and purpose of the American public school system were 
well described by two historians, who stated: “[P]ublic education 
must prepare pupils for citizenship in the Republic . . . .”  
—Bethel School District v. Fraser (1986)204  
Interest in the mental health of . . . students falls well within the 
state’s authority as parens patriae [and] . . . may legitimately play a 
role in the care and nurture of children entrusted to [it] for 
schooling. 
—Fields v. Palmdale (2005)205 
 
 
 200. Id. at 181. 
 201. Id. at 179 (emphasis in text).  
 202. Blau v. Fort Thomas Pub. Sch. Dist., 401 F.3d 381, 386 (6th Cir. 2005). The court ultimately 
held that “issues of public education are generally ‘committed to the control of state and local 
authorities.’” Id. at 396. 
 203. See Miller v. Mitchell, 598 F.3d 139 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 204. 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986) (quoting C. BEARD & M. BEARD, NEW BASIC HISTORY OF THE 
UNITED STATES 228 (1968)) (alterations in original). 
 205. 427 F.3d 1197, 1210 (9th Cir. 2005). 
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Public schools today prepare students for citizenship by inculcating 
liberal values and by managing their mental, physical, and sexual health.206 
This Part demonstrates how mandated dress codes,207 liberal education,208 
diversity,209 and community service210 have been upheld and commended 
by courts as crucial to shaping future citizens of the state. Courts have also 
found that techniques such as mandatory health surveys,211 health 
education classes,212 HIV education programs,213 and voluntary condom-
distribution programs are necessary for the health of the population.214 
Such techniques are understood by courts as non-coercive.215 
Melissa Murray and Alice Ristroph have critiqued “the use of state 
power to encourage or discourage particular visions of the family.”216 The 
authors rely on principles of anti-totalitarianism to make a strong case for 
“disestablishing the family.”217 By this they mean that the government 
should refrain from encouraging certain family forms while discouraging 
others. Murray and Ristroph center their discussion on a range of 
constitutional challenges to state regulation of families decided by the 
Supreme Court.218 Interestingly, in opting-out disputes after Yoder, an 
indirect and less apparent form of governing the family emerges: the state 
shapes the values and health of its future citizens by mandating health, 
sexuality, and liberal education in public schools.219 
 
 
 206. See Bethel, 478 U.S. at 681 (observing that public schools “‘inculcate the habits and manners 
of civility as values in themselves conducive to happiness and as indispensable to the practice of self-
government in the community and the nation.’”) (quoting C. BEARD & M. BEARD, NEW BASIC 
HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 228 (1968)). 
 207. Littlefield v. Forney, 268 F.3d 275 (5th Cir. 2001); Blau, 401 F.3d 381.  
 208. Mozert v. Hawkins Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058, 1067 (6th Cir. 1987). 
 209. Parker v. Hurley, 514 F.3d 87 (1st Cir. 2008). 
 210. Herndon v. Chapel Hill-Carrboro Bd. of Educ., 89 F.3d 174 (4th Cir. 1996). 
 211. Fields v. Palmdale, 427 F.3d 1197, 1210 (9th Cir. 2005); C.N. v. Ridgewood Bd. of Educ., 
430 F.3d 159 (3d Cir. 2005).  
 212. Leebaert v. Harrington, 332 F.3d 134 (2d Cir. 2003). 
 213. Brown v. Hot, Sexy & Safer Prods., Inc., 68 F.3d 525 (1st Cir. 1995). 
 214. Curtis v. Sch. Comm. of Falmouth, 652 N.E.2d 580 (Mass. 1995); see also RICHARD H. 
THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH & 
HAPPINESS 1–3 (2009) (discussing the ordering of items on school cafeteria lines). 
 215. Thaler and Sunstein have called some of these techniques “nudging,” which they define as 
“any aspect of the choice architecture that alters people’s behavior in a predictable way without 
forbidding any options or significantly changing their economic incentives.” THALER & SUNSTEIN, 
supra note 214, at 6. 
 216. Ristroph & Murray, supra note 103, at 1241.  
 217. Id. 
 218. Their examples include Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1992); Michael H. v. Gerald D, 491 
U.S. 110 (1989); Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000); Reynolds v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 975 
(2012); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); and 
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
 219. See also MICHEL FOUCAULT, SECURITY, TERRITORY, POPULATION 105 (2009) (“What can 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
398 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 90:363 
 
 
 
Monitoring, improving, surveying, and nudging do not appear to 
today’s courts as coercive.220 The narrow interpretation of the coercion 
standard by courts has led to one-sided judicial outcomes favoring schools 
in opting-out disputes.221 The heavy-handed idea of coercion that courts 
use as a baseline is forceful state regulation, such as prohibiting the study 
of a language or mandating public school attendance. Courts typically 
defer to public schools unless “the governmental action is mandatory and 
provides no outlet for the parents.”222 That is, where the state is “requiring 
or prohibiting” an activity.223 This is the legacy of the anti-totalitarian 
frame of Meyer and Pierce. Today’s dissenting families often fail to meet 
this formidable standard.224 Thus a new understanding of familial liberty is 
needed. Part III offers this understanding through a framework that I call 
“family laws,” which responds to recent legislative developments in the 
wake of the courts’ retrenchment. 
C. Legislative Discontent 
State legislatures have begun to show signs of dissatisfaction with this 
judicial trend. Most recently, in January of 2012, the New Hampshire 
legislature passed a bill that allows parents “to request an alternative 
school curriculum for any subject to which they register an objection.”225 
This legislation immediately sparked a national debate about the role of 
public schools and the extent to which families should be able to shape 
their children’s curriculum.226  
 
 
the end of government be? Certainly not to govern, but to improve the condition of the population, to 
increase its wealth, its longevity and its health. And the instruments that government will use to obtain 
these ends are, in a way, immanent to the field of population; it will be by acting directly on the 
population itself through campaigns, or, indirectly, by, for example, techniques that, without people 
being aware of it, stimulate the birth rate, or direct the flow of the population to this or that activity.”). 
 220. Cf. THALER & SUNSTEIN, supra note 214, at 6 (defining a “nudge” as “any aspect of the 
choice architecture that alters people’s behavior in a predictable way without forbidding any options or 
significantly changing their economic incentives”).  
 221. See Gilles, supra note 34 (arguing that the standard is deferential); see also Heather M. 
Good, Comment, “The Forgotten Child of Our Constitution”: The Parental Free Exercise Right to 
Direct the Education and Religious Upbringing of Children, 54 EMORY L.J. 641 (2005). 
 222. Curtis v. Sch. Comm. of Falmouth, 652 N.E.2d 580, 586 (Mass. 1995). 
 223. Doe v. Irwin, 615 F.2d 1162, 1168 (6th Cir. 1980). 
 224. But see Arnold v. Bd. of Ed., 880 F.2d 305 (11th Cir. 1989); Gruenke v. Seip, 225 F.3d 290 
(3d Cir. 2000). 
 225. John Celock, New Hampshire Lawmakers Pass Law Allowing Parental Objections to 
Curriculum, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 4, 2012, 6:15 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/01/04/ 
new-hampshire-legislature-curriculum-objection-law_n_1184476.html. See also H.B. 542, 2011 Gen. 
Ct., 162d Sess. (N.H. 2012). The bill was passed as part of a veto override.  
 226. See, e.g., Celock, supra note 225; see also Room for Debate, Should Parents Control What 
Kids Learn at School?, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 24, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2012/01/ 
24/should-parents-control-what-kids-learn-at-school.  
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But the New Hampshire legislation is not a peculiar outlier. Several 
other states have enacted similar legislation offering more robust 
protection of familial liberties. A Minnesota statute, for example, sets up a 
“parental curriculum review” that enables a “parent, guardian, or adult 
student [who] objects to the content, to make reasonable arrangements 
with school personnel for alternative instruction.”227 This legislation also 
clarifies that schools will not bear the cost of such alternative 
instruction.228 Likewise, a Nebraska statute requires all public school 
districts in the state to develop and adopt policies that would “involve 
parents in the schools and [state] what parents’ rights shall be relating to 
access to the schools, testing information, and curriculum matters.”229 In 
particular, the policy must include the circumstances under which “parents 
may ask that their children be excused from testing, classroom instruction, 
and other school experiences the parents may find objectionable.”230 Still 
other states have created narrower opting-out regimes that target only part 
of the curriculum, such as health education or “family life instruction.”231 
 
 
 227. MINN. STAT. § 120B.20 (2010) (“Each school district shall have a procedure for a parent, 
guardian, or an adult student, 18 years of age or older, to review the content of the instructional 
materials to be provided to a minor child or to an adult student and, if the parent, guardian, or adult 
student objects to the content, to make reasonable arrangements with school personnel for alternative 
instruction. Alternative instruction may be provided by the parent, guardian, or adult student if the 
alternative instruction, if any, offered by the school board does not meet the concerns of the parent, 
guardian, or adult student.”); see also TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 26.010 (West 2006) (Exemption From 
Instruction) (“A parent is entitled to remove the parent’s child temporarily from a class or other school 
activity that conflicts with the parent’s religious or moral beliefs if the parent presents or delivers to 
the teacher of the parent’s child a written statement authorizing the removal of the child from the class 
or other school activity. A parent is not entitled to remove the parent’s child from a class or other 
school activity to avoid a test or to prevent the child from taking a subject for an entire semester.”). 
 228. § 120B.20 (“The school board is not required to pay for the costs of alternative instruction 
provided by a parent, guardian, or adult student. School personnel may not impose an academic or 
other penalty upon a student merely for arranging alternative instruction under this section. School 
personnel may evaluate and assess the quality of the student’s work.”). 
 229. NEB. REV. STAT. § 79-531 (2008) (Parental involvement; public school district; adopt 
policy).  
 230. NEB. REV. STAT. § 79-532 (2008) (Parental involvement; policy; contents).  
 231. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-32-50 (West 2004) (“Pursuant to policies and guidelines adopted 
by the local school board, public school principals shall develop a method of notifying parents of 
students in the relevant grades of the content of the instructional materials concerning reproductive 
health, family life, pregnancy prevention, and of their option to exempt their child from this 
instruction, and sexually transmitted diseases if instruction in the diseases is presented as a separate 
component . . . . No student must be penalized as a result of an exemption. School districts shall use 
procedures to ensure that students exempted from the program by their parents or guardians are not 
embarrassed by the exemption.”); see also ALA. CODE § 16-41-6 (2001) (Religious conflicts) (“Any 
child whose parent presents to the school principal a signed statement that the teaching of disease, its 
symptoms, development and treatment and the use of instructional aids and materials of such subjects 
conflict with the religious teachings of his church shall be exempt from such instruction, and no child 
so exempt shall be penalized by reason of such exemption.”); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 10-16e (West 
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Interestingly, these laws reinstate the former relationship between 
public schools and families struck by courts in the common-law era: the 
family is once again deemed supreme in opting-out disputes.232 Families 
are vested with broad discretion in matters of education and can opt out of 
the public school curriculum for many reasons. By effectively 
circumventing holdings such as Leebaert,233 Mozert,234 Fields,235 and 
Parker,236 these statutes signal public dissatisfaction with the treatment of 
familial liberties in federal courts. 
Are these legislative schemes desirable? Does the state have any 
legitimate interest in mandating certain health and liberal instruction of its 
future adult citizens? Part III presents an alternative proposal that offers a 
middle way between the absolute liberties that some state legislatures have 
vested in parents, and the near absence of such liberties in the opting-out 
jurisprudence of the last four decades. The proposal turns on what I call 
the “Lawmaking Family.” 
III. EMPOWERING THE LAWMAKING FAMILY 
The rules and principles of justice, the formal institutions of the law, 
and the conventions of a social order are, indeed, important . . . ; 
they are, however, but a small part of the normative universe that 
ought to claim our attention. 
—Robert Cover237 
 
 
2010) (“[N]o student shall be required . . . to participate in any . . . family life program which may be 
offered within such public schools.”); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:35-4.7 (West 1999) (“Any child whose 
parent or guardian presents to the school principal a signed statement that any part of the instructions 
in health, family life education or sex education is in conflict with his conscience, or sincerely held 
moral or religious beliefs shall be excused from that portion of the course where such instruction is 
being given and no penalties as to credit or graduation shall result therefrom.”); TENN. CODE ANN. 
§ 49-6-1303 (2009) (“(a) Upon receipt of a written statement from a student’s parent or guardian to the 
effect that the parent or guardian has personally examined the appropriate grade level instructional 
materials or has conferred directly with the student’s instructor, school counselor or principal and that 
the parent or guardian finds objectionable any or all portions of family life instruction, the student shall 
be excused from such portion or portions of family life instruction.”); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, § 134 
(2004) (“Any pupil whose parent shall present to the school principal a signed statement that the 
teaching of disease, its symptoms, development and treatment, conflicts with the parents’ religious 
convictions shall be exempt from such instruction, and no child so exempt shall be penalized by reason 
of that exemption.”). 
 232. See supra Part II.A.  
 233. 332 F.3d 134 (2d Cir. 2003).  
 234. 827 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1987). 
 235. 427 F.3d 1197 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 236. 514 F.3d 87, 97 (1st Cir. 2008). 
 237. Cover, supra note 13, at 4. 
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It is time for a more nuanced discussion of familial liberty. Ideas about 
liberty and coercion in Meyer and Pierce are anachronistic today. School 
governance has changed. Express prohibitions, such as those challenged in 
Meyer and Pierce, rarely arise in contemporary disputes. New techniques 
of governance include managing the health, sexuality, and liberal 
development of students through surveys, nudges, and mandatory 
readings. This Part offers schools, legislators, and courts a new framework 
to limit these techniques. This framework is based on a concept of “family 
laws.” 
A. What are “Family Laws”? 
We have seen that scholars and courts have so far understood opting-
out conflicts as questions of authority or supremacy, and that this has led 
to binary legal outcomes. In the common-law era, courts viewed the 
family as supreme, and the teacher was understood to be primarily a 
service provider. By contrast, in the past four decades, courts have viewed 
the state as legitimately governing the health and values of its future 
citizens. But what if instead of asking who should have greater authority, 
we ask what is at stake for the dissenting family? 
Consider the following example. A vegetarian family seeks to exempt a 
child from a nutrition class in which the killing of animals is treated 
uncritically. We do not yet know the reason for the family’s request. The 
family could be trying to avoid exposure to materials that violate a 
vegetarian norm of non-violence towards animals. But the family could 
also be seeking to exempt the child because the child has a hard time 
waking up for early morning classes or because the family does not like 
the teacher’s teaching style or because the child thinks it’s icky to dissect a 
frog. Should it matter if the family’s request to opt out of the mandatory 
nutrition class is based on a familial norm, a child’s habits, a mere 
preference, or something else? Under some of the new legislative opting-
out proposals, it would not matter; this Part argues that it should. 
Our religious, ethical, and moral convictions are central to our 
existence and our understanding of who we are, in ways that preferences 
and habits are not. This Article offers a theory that would help schools, 
courts, and legislators systematize and empower these zones of familial 
lawmaking in the context of opting-out disputes. 
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Jurists and legal philosophers have been deciphering concepts of “law” 
and “legality” for decades.238 But laws and legalities generated by formal 
state institutions are only “a small part of the normative universe that 
ought to claim our attention.”239 There are many kinds of familial norms, 
but not all of them are included in what I call “family laws.”240 A family 
norm should be treated as a family law if it is: (1) general and articulable; 
(2) grounded in religion, ethics, or morality; and (3) perceived as binding 
by members of a particular family.241 When these three conditions are 
satisfied, a family law is in place. I will explain each part of the test in 
turn. 
1. General and Articulable Norms 
To qualify as a family law, a norm should be specific enough to 
prescribe or prohibit action and general enough to be applicable in future 
situations.242 A standard such as “be nice to others” is probably too vague 
to be considered a family law because it does not convey enough 
specificity about what actions must be undertaken to comply. Likewise, a 
rule that by its own terms applies only occasionally, such as “we 
sometimes recycle because we care about the environment,” is not general 
enough to constitute a family law. 
Family laws may regulate a variety of activities and behaviors. They 
could regulate, for instance, how family members contract, or how they 
fulfill duties of love and care towards each other. Family laws could also 
guarantee equality among family members. Consider, for example, a rule 
that permits family members to enter into agreements with other family 
members regarding household duties (“I will clean the dishes now if you 
change the baby’s diaper later”), but prohibits such agreements if they 
involve monetary exchange (“I will pay you five dollars if you change the 
baby’s diaper”); or a tort-like rule that requires family members to warn 
 
 
 238. Legal Positivists historically separated the concept of law from morality and defined law as 
an enforceable command by a sovereign who can rule others but is not ruled by them. See, e.g., JOHN 
AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED (1998). H.L.A. Hart refined Austin’s theory 
with a theory of primary and secondary rules, arguing that the rule of recognition is a primary rule that 
helps identify law. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 97 (1961). See also SCOTT J. SHAPIRO, 
LEGALITY (2011) (proposing a theory of law as plans). 
 239. Cover, supra note 13, at 4 (arguing that insular communities create and interpret laws that 
deserve state protection, and identifying three characteristics of the laws of insular communities: 
(1) commitment; (2) objectification; and (3) dedication).  
 240. For a discussion of non-state actors as lawmakers, see Barbara Ann Atwood, Tribal 
Jurisprudence and Cultural Meanings of the Family, 79 NEB. L. REV. 577 (2000) (exploring how 
Indian tribal judges constitute their tribe’s unique culture in the domain of family dispute resolution).  
 241. For a discussion of the issue of dissent within the family, see infra Part III.B.1. 
 242. HART, supra note 238, at 200–13.  
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other family members about potential dangers no matter how remote or 
unlikely to occur; or an antidiscrimination rule that prohibits all gender 
stereotyping in the family. Of course, the point is not that the existence of 
an articulable family norm should result in the enforcement of 
idiosyncratic contract and tort rules by courts, but rather that families 
create and live by legal norms regardless of their enforceability by formal 
institutions of law. Families sometimes inhabit a legal universe that is not 
coextensive with that of the state. In opting-out disputes, families are often 
asking that they not be forced to participate in programs or activities that 
violate their family laws. 
2. Grounded in Religion, Ethics, or Morality 
The second characteristic of a family law is that it is grounded in 
ethical, moral, or religious principles.243 As described in Part II, religious 
“ways of life” currently receive greater protection than secular ones.244 
Thus, a parent who today offers a secular justification for opting-out of a 
program or policy, as in Blau245 (opposing a dress code on secular 
grounds) and Herndon246 (opposing mandatory community service), stands 
a lesser chance of success than a parent who offers a religious justification 
for opting out, as in Needville247 (successfully opposing a grooming policy 
on religious grounds) and Arnold248 (successfully opposing school 
intervention in teen pregnancy on religious grounds). 
 
 
 243. Whereas my proposal does not discriminate among family laws that are ethical, moral or 
religious, courts in the past have had to decide whether “secular” ethical or moral commitments should 
be treated on par with religious commitments for specific purposes. For example, in the context of a 
draft exemption for conscientious objectors in the Vietnam War, the Court broadly defined the term 
“religion,” to include ethical and moral motives that do not stem from any founded religion. See 
United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 176 (1965) (defining the term “religious” under the Universal 
Military Training and Service Act, 50 U.S.C.S. § 456(j) to include “A sincere and meaningful belief 
which occupies in the life of its possessor a place parallel to that filled by the God of those admittedly 
qualifying for the exemption.”); But see Kalka v. Hawk, 215 F.3d 90, 98 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (observing 
in the case of a federal prisoner whose request to form humanist groups within the prison chapel was 
denied, that “traditional notions of religion surely would not include humanism. ‘The term “religion” 
has reference to one’s views of his relations to his Creator, and to the obligations they impose of 
reverence for his being and character, and of obedience to his will.’” (internal citation omitted). I thank 
Nancy Knauer for pointing me to this line of cases. 
 244. On the relationship between religious and non-religious conscience, see generally Nathan S. 
Chapman, Disentangling Conscience and Religion, 2012 ILL. L. REV. (forthcoming). 
 245. Blau v. Fort Thomas Pub. Sch. Dist., 401 F.3d 381 (6th Cir. 2005). 
 246. Herndon v. Chapel Hill-Carrboro Bd. of Educ., 89 F.3d 174 (4th Cir. 1996). 
 247. A.A. v. Needville Indep. Sch. Dist., 611 F.3d 248 (5th Cir. 2010). 
 248. Arnold v. Bd. of Educ., 880 F.2d 305 (11th Cir. 1989). 
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One of the novelties of this alternative scheme is that when a family 
norm is general and articulable, it should not matter whether it is religious 
or secular. This is because what religious values mean to some families, 
secular values may mean to others. The state grants legal protection to 
religious values because of their significance to families, not because they 
are inherently true (that, state law has no tools to assess). Non-religious 
ethical or moral systems deserve similar respect. In constitutional terms, it 
should not matter whether a family law is invoked under the Free Exercise 
Clause (as in Yoder) or the Due Process Clause (as in Meyer and 
Pierce).249 A religious family prohibition could require, for example, that 
“no family member eat on Yom Kippur,” whereas a secular prohibition 
could require that “no family member eat or wear animal products.” A 
religious obligation could require that “all family members pray five times 
a day,” and a secular obligation could require that “all family members 
must recycle plastic containers to protect mother earth.” Both types of 
prohibitions and obligations can qualify as family laws, if they meet the 
criteria set out here. 
A family preference or habit is distinguishable from a family law. A 
family may gravitate toward Blues over Bach; Earl Gray over espresso; 
Winnie the Pooh over Alice in Wonderland; Thai food over Italian food; or 
as in Blau, “nice clothes” over a school uniform.250 Such preferences and 
habits should not be treated as family laws for the purpose of opting-out 
disputes. Individuals and family members suffer a special kind of injury 
when religious, moral, or ethical convictions are disregarded by the state. 
This harm is distinguishable from harms that are caused when a mere 
preference or habit is disregarded, and is thus worthy of the special 
attention of lawmakers proposed here. 
3. Perceived by Family Members as Binding 
The final characteristic of a family law is that it should be understood 
by family members as binding.251 It is not enough that family members 
follow a certain rule. They must do so because they feel bound by it, such 
that a family member who breaches a family law can be viewed as 
blameworthy or lawless.252 In Yoder, as Robert Cover points out, if the 
Amish families had followed the Amish principles only because it was 
 
 
 249. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 397 (1923); Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534–
35 (1925); Wisconsin v.Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 207 (1972).  
 250. Blau, 401 F.3d at 386. 
 251. But see discussion of dissenting family members infra Part III.B.1.  
 252. See Cover, supra note 13, at 45. 
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enjoyable to do so, they would not have disobeyed any principle if they 
had abandoned the Amish way of life, and thus “they could not hold 
someone blameworthy—lawless—were he to give in.”253 Likewise, in 
A.A.254 the Fifth Circuit granted a Native American family an exemption 
from a grooming policy because the child and the family demonstrated a 
sincere religious belief in wearing the boy’s hair uncovered and visibly 
long.255 If the Native American plaintiff in A.A. had followed the 
haircutting principles typical among Native Americans only because it was 
pleasurable or aesthetically pleasing to do so, he would probably not have 
prevailed in court and those principles would not constitute a family law 
as the term is used here. 
The same principle should apply when the family law at stake is based 
on secular ethics or morality.256 Consider, for instance, the plaintiff-mother 
in Miller257 who refused to expose her teenage daughter to a program filled 
with gender-stereotyping messages about promiscuous female sexuality.258 
To establish a family law here, the mother would have to show not only 
that her opposition to gender stereotyping stems from an ethical 
commitment to a set of feminist principles, but also that by sending her 
daughter to such a learning environment she would in fact compromise her 
family law of gender equality. That is, that doing so would make her feel 
lawless or blameworthy. 
Or consider a secular thank-you-note-writing family. Thank-you notes 
are obviously extremely unlikely to trigger opting-out disputes,259 but the 
example is nonetheless conceptually helpful. Assume that a family rule 
that requires the writing of thank-you notes is based on an ethical 
commitment to express gratitude and familial love. Such a rule would be 
considered a family law under the proposed approach if the family 
members also viewed themselves as bound by the rule. In other words, if 
 
 
 253. Id.  
 254. A.A. v. Needville Indep. Sch. Dist., 611 F.3d 248 (5th Cir. 2010). 
 255. Id. at 272 (deciding the case on state free exercise grounds). 
 256. Obviously, secular family laws cannot be the basis of First Amendment free exercise 
challenges, but they can be brought under the Due Process Clause, as was the case in Meyer, Pierce, 
and many other challenges examined above. See supra note 249. 
 257. Miller v. Mitchell, 598 F.3d 139 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 258. Id. (holding that the district attorney violated a mother’s fundamental right to raise her child 
without undue state interference).  
 259. It is interesting to imagine, however, an opting-out dispute involving a parent who wanted to 
opt her child out of a class discussion of anthropological critiques of gift exchange. See, e.g., MARCEL 
MAUSS, THE GIFT (2000) (arguing that gifts in most cultures give rise to reciprocal exchange); 
ROBERT B. CIALDINI, INFLUENCE: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF PERSUASION (1993). 
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thank-you-note rule violators are considered lawless or blameworthy, a 
family law may exist under the proposed approach. 
Family laws are importantly distinguishable from “social norms.” 
Social norms are rules of behavior that individuals follow independent of 
any formal legal obligation or official sanction for non-compliance.260 
Thus, under the framework offered here, social norms should be classified 
as habits or mere preferences and not as family laws. Clare Huntington has 
recently argued that “[social] norms particularly shape the relationships 
and intimate decisions that fall within the ambit of family law.”261 
Huntington nicely demonstrates that the state can potentially influence 
various “familial social norms” such as a visibly pregnant woman’s 
decision to refrain from ordering a glass of wine in a restaurant, a parent’s 
decision to discipline a child in public, or the decision of a closeted person 
to bring her female partner to the office holiday party.262 Family laws and 
social norms may sometimes overlap, but the key difference is that the 
commitment to family laws is generally greater and perceived by family 
members as more binding than the choice whether or not to follow a social 
norm.  
In sum, a family law is in place if a dissenting family can establish that 
a given familial norm is (1) general and articulable; (2) grounded in 
religion, ethics, or morality; and (3) perceived as binding by members of a 
particular family.  
B. Limiting Principles  
There are three important qualifications to the liberty to opt out 
proposed here. First, dissenting family members should be entitled to an 
independent decision-making process, regardless of the opting-out 
requests of parents. Second, violent family laws should not trigger the 
liberty to opt out. Third, the liberty to opt out is negative by nature, and 
thus does not cover more intrusive remedies. I will briefly discuss each 
qualification.  
 
 
 260. See, e.g., Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96 
MICH. L. REV. 338, 340 (1997) (defining social norms as “informal social regularities that individuals 
feel obligated to follow”); Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 
914 (1996) (defining social norms as “social attitudes of approval and disapproval, specifying what 
ought to be done and what ought not to be done”). 
 261. Clare Huntington, Familial Norms and Normality, 59 EMORY L.J. 1103, 1105 (2010); see 
also Elizabeth S. Scott, Social Norms and the Legal Regulation of Marriage, 86 VA. L. REV. 1901 
(2000). 
 262. Huntington, supra note 261, at 1105. 
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1. Familial Dissent  
In articulating a liberty for the jurisgenerative activities of families, 
there is an important complicating factor: the internal dissenters who may 
challenge family laws and the status quo from within. Empowering 
lawmaking families without recognizing these inside warriors of change—
or just uncommitted bystanders—may have undesirable, or even 
devastating, effects. As Madhavi Sunder has argued, “[l]egally enforced 
cultural boundaries could, conceivably, accord powerful members of 
cultural groups the ability to suppress any rumblings for change in a 
culture, particularly by censoring or excluding those members who 
challenge power relationships within a culture and threaten the status 
quo.”263 Sunder criticizes the fact that “law remains steadfastly committed 
to the old-world view of cultural diversity as existing across cultures, but 
not within them.”264 Similar concerns certainly apply in the smaller social 
units of lawmaking families.265 
The liberty to opt out should be conditioned on alignment between the 
student and his or her family. As we saw in Part II, students and parents 
often bring joint claims against schools, and are often (or at least appear to 
be) of one mind. But there will be times when a student does not wish to 
opt out of a school activity or program, and the parent or guardian does,or 
vice versa. Imagine, for example, a child who wants to participate in frog 
dissection classes despite parental objections. Or a child who wishes to opt 
out of frog dissection classes, despite parental wishes for the child to 
participate in such classes.266 In such cases of individual dissent, the 
student’s autonomy (auto-nomy, literally self-legislating) should prevail.267 
Thus, if a child dissents from a familial opting-out request, the parental 
request should be dismissed.268  
 
 
 263. Madhavi Sunder, Cultural Dissent, 54 STAN. L. REV. 495, 503 (2001).  
 264. Id. at 500 (“The ‘right to associate,’ the ‘right to culture,’ the ‘right to religion,’ and other 
laws are interpreted to defend cultural groups against the forces of modernization and change.”). 
 265. Instead of what Sunder views as the prevalent “cultural survival” approach, Sunder favors an 
approach of “cultural dissent.” Id. at 500–01; see also Janet E. Halley, Culture Constrains, in IS 
MULTICULTURALISM BAD FOR WOMEN? 100, 103–04 (Joshua Cohen et al. eds., Princeton University 
Press 1999). 
 266. I thank Chapin Cimino for offering this example.  
 267. A similar principle applies here. Just as dissenting families should possess the liberty to 
dissent from mandated state education, dissenting individual family members should possess the 
liberty to dissent from mandated family laws.  
 268. If a child individually wishes to opt out of a program or policy, against parental wishes to the 
contrary, a different grounding principle may be necessary. In a current work in progress entitled 
“Cultivating Thinking,” I further develop the premise of lawmaking individuals.  
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While detecting cultural dissent may prove a difficult task for judges, 
the school setting may offer resources for detecting and empowering 
dissenters. Thus, when a family seeks an opt-out based on a family law, 
the inquiry would ideally begin with an age-appropriate evaluation by 
guidance counselors or other professionals, assessing the particular family 
and its norms, and how the individual child relates to those 
commitments.269 This inquiry should help the school, and later the court, if 
needed, to determine if the family’s law warrants the liberty to opt out.  
2. Violent Family Laws  
Not all family laws should trigger the liberty to opt out. A family law 
that supports violence against others should not trigger a family’s liberty 
to opt out. Consider the following examples: A family wishes to excuse a 
child from classes about the Civil War because the family believes that 
forced slavery is morally superior to equal citizenship; a family wishes to 
opt out of Holocaust education based on a family law that favors killing 
Jews, Gypsies, homosexuals, and people with disabilities; a family wishes 
to opt out of reading about transgender people because it believes in 
bullying and shaming transgender children; a family wishes to opt out of 
sex education classes because it believes that promiscuous women deserve 
to be sexually abused. Even if such families can establish the existence of 
a family law, the liberty to opt out should not be granted in such cases.270  
There are at least two justifications for excluding violent family laws. 
First, the second part of the proposed family-laws test involves laws that 
are religious, ethical, or moral.271 Family laws that preach hatred and 
violence rarely can be grounded on religion, ethics, or morality. Thus, they 
may not qualify as family laws to begin with.272 The vast majority of 
religious, ethical, and moral systems have a general requirement of other–
regardingness, usually reflected in a host of more concrete obligations. 
Individual deviations lack grounding in these traditions, and thus are likely 
to lack the regularity of a law. Second, when family laws advocate 
violence against others, there is a reason to worry that children raised in 
such families may indeed harm others. Refusing an opt-out request in such 
 
 
 269. The norms guiding these professionals would probably have to be rules rather than standards 
if we wish to avoid alliance with majority values and dismissal of family laws that do not appeal to the 
evaluating professional.  
 270. See Parker v. Hurley, 514 F.3d 87 (1st Cir. 2008).  
 271. See supra Part III.A.2. 
 272. However, there may be family laws that are offensive and should nonetheless merit opting 
out. 
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situations may help to cultivate internal dissent within violent families, 
and at the same time possibly protect potential victims of violence.  
3. Non-Invasiveness  
The liberty to opt out proposed here does not carry with it any 
prerogative to change or alter the curriculum for other children. It only 
enables a temporary exit, a “time-out” by choice, for students whose 
family laws conflict with a given program or policy. Courts have 
repeatedly dismissed opting-out claims based on the notion that parents 
cannot “prescribe the curriculum.”273 This language is misguided. 
Dissenting families rarely sue in courts attempting to “prescribe” the 
curriculum. They seek to opt out. This Article argues that, subject to three 
limiting principles, they should possess the liberty to do so.  
Dissenting families may sometimes seek a remedy that is more robust 
than an opt-out. Consider for example condom machines. Even if 
dissenting families can demonstrate that condom machines seriously 
offend family laws regarding sexual abstinence, there is no meaningful 
way to enable dissenters to opt out without burdening the architecture of 
the school and the lives of other students.274 Likewise, because school 
cafeterias usually do not offer enough vegetarian options, vegetarian 
children often end up bringing their own lunch.275 By bringing their own 
lunch, these students are already exercising the liberty to opt out of eating 
cafeteria food. Dissenting families in both examples would not be able to 
utilize this proposal beyond an inherent liberty that they can already 
exercise, that is, the choice not to obtain condoms or eat cafeteria food. 
C. Implications of the Liberty to Opt Out  
By strengthening the liberty of lawmaking families to opt out, 
lawmakers could breathe new life into the liberty professed by Meyer and 
Pierce.276 This Article argues, with some qualifications discussed above, 
 
 
 273. See supra Part II.C. 
 274. See, e.g., Curtis v. Sch. Comm. of Falmouth, 652 N.E.2d 580 (Mass. 1995). 
 275. CAROL J. ADAMS, LIVING AMONG MEAT EATERS: THE VEGETARIAN’S SURVIVAL 
HANDBOOK 176 (Three Rivers Press 2001) (“School cafeterias. Assume nothing. From preschool to 
high school, the choices may be very limited. Bringing lunches will be your best option. If you wish to 
make some changes, contact EarthSave and find out about their school-lunch campaign.”). 
 276. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Pierce v. Soc’t of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925). In 
these two cases, the Court expressed an aversion to the idea of the state producing “ideal citizens” at 
the cost of familial liberty. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 401 (“That the State may do much, go very far, indeed, 
in order to improve the quality of its citizens, physically, mentally and morally, is clear; but the 
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that a dissenting family today should be granted the liberty to opt out when 
its family laws conflict with a public school mandatory program or policy. 
Notably, for religious families, recognition of the liberty to opt out of 
aspects of public school education is already on the rise: it is increasingly 
created through new state and local legislative initiatives.277 This Article 
offers a theory to explain and qualify this legislative development, and 
argues that it should apply to families associated with the political left as 
well.  
We now turn to three representative types of familial lawmaking: 
(1) religious; (2) feminist; and (3) vegetarian. For all three types, this 
Article argues, the establishment of a family law would trigger the liberty 
to opt out of mandatory programs and policies, subject to the limitations 
described above. We will now see how the proposed approach would 
affect outcomes of past and future opting-out disputes.  
1. Religious Family Laws  
Given the secularization of public schools throughout the twentieth 
century, much contemporary opting-out litigation involves religious 
dissent.278 Part II argued that courts currently lack effective tools to 
address religious family laws. We have also seen that state legislatures 
share this insight and are gradually stepping in to fill that gap.279 Several 
cases involving religious dissent provide useful examples for the 
application of the family-laws framework.  
In Leebaert,280 a father sought to excuse his child, who was in the 
seventh grade at the time, from mandatory health-education classes.281 The 
father explained in an affidavit how the contested health curriculum 
conflicted with his sincerely held religious beliefs:282  
While I do not belong to any institutionalized religion, I have 
religious beliefs which incorporate, in my view, the best from all 
religions. . . . [C]hildren should be taught just do not engage in 
drugs or tobacco. . . . [M]y religious view on sex before marriage is 
that it is something I do not want my sons to be involved in. I teach 
 
 
individual has certain fundamental rights which must be respected.”); Pierce, 268 U.S. at 535 (“The 
fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments in this Union repose excludes any general 
power of the State to standardize its children . . . .”). 
 277. See discussion supra Part II.C. 
 278. See supra Part II.B. 
 279. See supra Part II.C. 
 280. Leebaert v. Harrington, 332 F.3d 134 (2d Cir. 2003). 
 281. Leebaert, 332 F.3d at 135.  
 282. Id. at 137–38. 
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them abstention because my religious view is that sex should be 
reserved for marriage when it is appropriate. . . . I believe that the 
way the school system teaches the subjects to which I sought to opt 
my son out of, is anti-religion. For one example, it doesn’t support a 
married man and woman together as the basic unit of the family. 
The school teaches that this unit can be comprised of anything or 
anyone, that anything you say can be a family. This contradicts my 
religious beliefs.283 
The father’s affidavit satisfies the three elements of a family law. First, the 
norms cited are general and articulable: children should be warned rather 
than educated about tobacco and alcohol; sex should be reserved for 
marriage; and only a man and a woman can form a family. Second, these 
norms are grounded in religion. The plaintiff claims to incorporate “the 
best from all religions,” but considers himself mostly Christian.284 Third, 
the plaintiff views himself as bound by these norms and would deem 
himself lawless and blameworthy if he failed to educate his son according 
to them.285 Nonetheless, under the narrowly construed coercion standard, 
the Second Circuit denied the family’s attempt to opt out.286 Under the 
scheme proposed in this Article, the Leebaert father and son would have 
been granted the liberty to opt out of the health curriculum.  
Parker and Mozert prompt a similar analysis.287 In both of these cases 
parents objected to mandatory readings in public schools that offended 
general and articulable religious family rules that family members 
probably viewed as binding. In Parker, the family laws involved a 
family’s commitment to heterosexual unions.288 This commitment may 
have been reflected in a family law that prohibits reading books such as 
King and King to children.289 In Mozert, the parents invoked a wide range 
of family laws, such as a commitment to traditional gender roles, a 
 
 
 283. Id.  
 284. Id. (“The basis of my religious beliefs is Christian, I consider myself to be a Christian and I 
was baptized a Catholic.”).  
 285. Id. at 138 (“I believe that God has empowered human beings with the right to bring their 
children up with correct moral principles in dealing with the issues taught in this course, not the school 
system. I claim the right, and responsibility, to impart those religious values which I have been taught 
to my children to develop their moral, ethical and religious character.”). 
 286. Id. at 145. 
 287. Parker v. Hurley, 514 F.3d 87 (1st Cir. 2008); Mozert v. Hawkins Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 827 
F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1987).  
 288. Parker, 514 F.3d at 92.  
 289. LINDA DE HAAN & STERN NIJLAND, supra note 181 (telling a children’s story in which a 
prince does not like any of the princesses brought before him, but falls in love with one princess’s 
brother and lives happily ever after). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
412 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 90:363 
 
 
 
commitment not to question the existence of God by teaching evolution, 
and a commitment not to question the killing of animals.290 Likewise, in 
Hot, Sexy & Safer Productions,291 parents and students alleged, in the 
context of a mandatory HIV-awareness program, that the school’s 
“endorsement and encouragement of sexual promiscuity at a mandatory 
assembly ‘imping[ed] on their sincerely held religious values regarding 
chastity and morality.’”292  
Plaintiffs in Leebaert, Parker, Mozert, and Hot, Sexy & Safer 
Productions, all of whom were unsuccessful in federal courts under the 
courts’ narrow construction of Meyer, Pierce, and Yoder, would satisfy the 
family-laws test for similar reasons.293 Plaintiff families pointed to specific 
family laws that conflicted with a mandated public school teaching. 
Religion served as the basis for objection, and the family expressed 
attitudes of deep commitment to their religious family laws. Thus, subject 
to the limits above, the liberty to opt out would be available to all these 
plaintiffs under the proposed scheme.  
Not all religious dissenters would prevail however. It seems that 
parents such as those in Fields294 and C.N.295 may not satisfy the family-
laws test. In Fields, elementary school children were questioned about a 
range of topics including sexuality.296 The parents invoked their religious 
faith and claimed that they possessed the liberty to direct the education of 
their children in all matters regarding sexuality.297 But they did not 
demonstrate any specific familial ethical, religious, or moral laws.298 
These parents were only asserting a right to control certain aspects of 
education. Likewise, in C.N.,299 parents complained that their children’s 
participation in a survey involving issues such as drug and alcohol use, 
sexual activity, suicide, and personal associations, intruded upon their 
parental authority to decide when and how to introduce their children to 
 
 
 290. Mozert, 827 F.2d at 1062.  
 291. Brown v. Hot, Sexy & Safer Prods., Inc., 68 F.3d 525 (1st Cir. 1995). 
 292. Id. at 537 (alterations in original). 
 293. Likewise, the Native-American family in Needville would easily establish the existence of a 
religious family law that is violated by a strict grooming policy. A.A. v. Needville Indep. Sch. Dist., 
611 F.3d 248 (5th Cir. 2010).  
 294. Fields v. Palmdale, 427 F.3d 1197 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 295. C.N. v. Ridgewood Bd. of Educ., 430 F.3d 159 (3d Cir. 2005). 
 296. Fields, 427 F.3d at 1200. The questioning was part of a survey regarding psychological 
barriers to learning, and the parents learned of the sexual nature of some of the questions on the survey 
when their children informed them of the questions after they had completed the questionnaires. Id. 
 297. Id. at 1202.  
 298. Id. at 1203.  
 299. C.N., 430 F.3d 159. 
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these topics.300 Again, these parents did not invoke existing family laws.301 
In such cases, the state’s  interest in the health and education of its citizens 
may prevail, and parents would not have the liberty to opt out. Thus, these 
two cases would probably not have come out differently, and the parents 
still would have lost under the proposed family-laws framework.  
We will sometimes agonize over the outcomes of this liberty. Some 
families will seek to opt out of learning about ethical and moral issues that 
may be dear to our hearts, such as sexual pluralism, reproductive rights, or 
civil liberties.302 There may also be real harms to the confidence and self-
esteem of children when they learn why their classmates have opted out of 
certain educational programs.303 But regardless of whether society blames 
or praises the content of any given family law, an honest social and legal 
commitment to liberty, pluralism, and diversity demands that family laws 
be taken seriously.304 
2. Feminist Family Laws 
Feminist family laws offer another domain of familial lawmaking. This 
Article argues that when public school education conflicts with a feminist 
family law, the liberty to opt out should also be automatically triggered. 
But first let us see how feminist family laws can satisfy the three-part test 
above.  
First, feminist family laws often generate an articulable set of rules or 
principles. These rules and principles may vary, depending on the feminist 
principles that family members are committed to. For example, an equality 
principle may generate rules like equal sharing of childcare;305 
 
 
 300. Id. 
 301. Id.  
 302. Mozert, 827 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1987); Leebaert, 332 F.3d 134 (2d Cir. 2003); Parker, 514 
F.3d 87 (1st Cir. 2008).  
 303. Perhaps it is worthwhile for a child to experience real life consequences of liberty and 
diversity rather than read about it. Recall, however, that the proposal includes limits on the sorts of 
harms that will be tolerated—through, for instance, the exclusion of violent family laws and of 
accommodation that would reshape the curriculum for everyone.  
 304. Cf. Heather K. Gerken, Second-Order Diversity, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1099, 1101 (2005) 
(arguing that “democracy sometimes benefits from having decisionmaking bodies that do not mirror 
the underlying population, but instead encompass a wide range of compositions. Second-order 
diversity involves variation among decisionmaking bodies, not within them . . .”). 
 305. See, e.g., Mary Anne Case, How High the Apple Pie? A Few Troubling Questions About 
Where, Why and How the Burden of Care for Children Should Be Shifted, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1753 
(2001). 
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hyphenation of last names;306 equal contribution to household chores;307 or 
related measures. An anti-subordination principle may generate rules 
involving types of sexual activities that are outside the limits of the family, 
such as bondage and sadomasochistic sex,308 or rules and principles 
involving the hiring and pay of household labor.309 A sexual liberation 
principle may involve radical honesty and sexual experimentation.310 Anti-
gender stereotyping principles may involve a commitment to 
nonconforming choices in children’s toys, names, or dress.311 These 
principles may even include encouraging children to choose their own 
gender.312 Of course, these are only a few examples of feminist family 
laws, and families can also combine any of the above or with religious or 
vegetarian laws.  
Second, feminist family laws are usually grounded in various ethical 
commitments such as equality,313 anti-subordination,314 ethics of care,315 
sexual liberation,316 autonomy,317 and social justice.318 The interpretive 
enterprise of feminist family laws involves interrogations of these core 
feminist principles out of a sense of commitment to the ethical systems 
that they represent. For some families, these acts of interpretation provide 
the foundation of a legal system that the family or household experiences 
as an essential part of its existence—a part that family members cannot 
 
 
 306. See, e.g., Elizabeth F. Emens, Changing Name Changing: Framing Rules and the Future of 
Marital Names, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 761 (2007). 
 307. Id.  
 308. Twyman v. Twyman, 855 S.W.2d 619 (Tex. 1993). 
 309. Katharine Silbaugh, Commodification and Women’s Household Labor, 9 YALE J.L. & 
FEMINISM 81 (1997).  
 310. Elizabeth F. Emens, Monogamy’s Law: Compulsory Monogamy and Polyamorous Existence, 
29 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 277 (2004). 
 311. See, e.g., Noa Ben-Asher, The Necessity of Sex Change: A Struggle for Intersex and Transsex 
Liberties, 29 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 51 (2006). 
 312. Some families have gone as far as resisting the gendering of children altogether by not 
revealing the child’s biological sex to the outside world. See id.  
 313. Case, supra note 29.  
 314. See, e.g., CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND 
LAW (Harvard University Press 1987); ANDREA DWORKIN, LIFE AND DEATH: UNAPOLOGETIC 
WRITINGS ON THE CONTINUING WAR AGAINST WOMEN (1997). 
 315. See, e.g., CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND 
WOMEN’S DEVELOPMENT (Harvard University Press 1993); ROBIN WEST, CARING FOR JUSTICE 
(1999); MARTHA A. FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY AND OTHER 
TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES (1995). 
 316. See, e.g., Katherine M. Franke, The Domesticated Liberty of Lawrence v. Texas, 104 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1399 (2004); Janet Halley, Sexuality Harassment, in DIRECTIONS IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT 
LAW (Catharine A. MacKinnon & Reva B. Siegel eds., Yale University Press 2004); Gayle Rubin, 
Thinking Sex: Notes for a Radical Theory of the Politics of Sexuality, in PLEASURE AND DANGER 
(Carole Vance ed., 1984).  
 317. MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, SEX & SOCIAL JUSTICE (Oxford University Press 1999).  
 318. FINEMAN, supra note 315.  
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live without. Finally, family members often feel bound by feminist family 
laws, and violating such laws can often be perceived as blameworthy or 
lawless. Mary Anne Case has aptly called such ethical commitments 
“feminist fundamentalism.”319 Just like religious family laws, a conflict 
between a mandatory school program and a feminist family law may be 
experienced as a violation of one’s core beliefs, ethics, or morals.  
Consider two recent opting-out conflicts involving feminist family laws 
and public education. In Miller,320 after a female teen who had “sexted” a 
photo of herself was caught, her mother resisted a gender-education 
program that would teach her daughter about the perils of female sexual 
permissiveness.321 The mother “object[ed] to the education program’s 
lessons in why the minors’ actions were wrong, [and] what it means to be 
a girl in today’s society” and “[s]he particularly opposes these value 
lessons from a District Attorney who has ‘stated publicly that a teen[]age 
girl who voluntarily posed for a photo wearing a swimsuit violated 
Pennsylvania’s child pornography statute.’”322 The mother claimed that 
“the program’s teachings that the minors’ actions [sexting] were morally 
‘wrong’ and created a victim contradict the beliefs and wishes she wished 
to instill in her daughter.”323  
The mother here would likely satisfy the family-laws test. First, she 
specified an articulable and general feminist norm: the sexuality of girls 
should not be perceived as dangerous or inappropriate because sexuality is 
not in and of itself dangerous or immoral. Second, this sex-positive norm 
can be seen as grounded in a certain strand of feminist ethics.324 Third, the 
mother’s commitment to feminist sex-positive principles seems to have 
been conveyed throughout this litigation. She does not seem to be 
following feminist rules because she finds them trendy or because she is 
particularly supportive of “sexting.” The mother’s actions seem driven by 
an actual commitment to feminist principles that she finds ethically 
binding and wishes to raise her child by.  
 
 
 319. Mary Anne Case, Feminist Fundamentalism on the Frontier Between Government and 
Family Responsibility for Children, 2009 UTAH L. REV. 381, 382 (2009) (defining feminist 
fundamentalism as “an uncompromising commitment to the equality of the sexes as intense and at 
least as worthy of respect as, for example, a religiously or culturally based commitment to female 
subordination or fixed sex roles”). 
 320. Miller v. Mitchell, 598 F.3d 139 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 321. Id. 
 322. Id. at 150.  
 323. Id.  
 324. See sources cited supra note 316. 
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Therefore, this feminist mother would likely prevail under the family-
laws scheme. Her claim would trigger the liberty to opt out of the 
educational program that she is challenging. Indeed, the court agreed that 
the district attorney could not “impose on . . . children his ideas of 
morality and gender roles,” and that the non-voluntary gender education 
program violated the mother’s right to direct the (feminist) upbringing of 
her child.325 Thus, Miller serves as an excellent example of a feminist 
family law dealing with female sexual liberation and gender stereotyping 
that triggered a right to opt out.  
By contrast, a federal court has recently rejected a mother’s feminist 
challenge to sex-based segregation in a public school.326 In Doe v. 
Vermilion Parish School Board, a mother challenged the constitutionality 
of a single-sex class policy in a school where two of her daughters 
attended. The plaintiff claimed that sex-based segregation violates 
constitutional and federal principles of equal protection.327 The court 
denied her request for a preliminary injunction, holding that the board did 
not intend to discriminate.328  
Would the alternative proposal offered here yield different results? 
That depends on what the plaintiff sought to achieve in the lawsuit. On the 
one hand, the mother could (and did) exempt her daughters from single-
sex education.329 This individual opt-out may be grounded in feminist 
ethics. The mother could readily demonstrate her commitment to such 
principles, and the harms she would suffer by their violation. Therefore, if 
all the mother had sought was to opt out of mandatory sex segregation, 
based on a family law, she would probably prevail under the proposed 
standard. But here the mother attempted to invalidate the entire system. 
She was not merely seeking to opt out.330 Thus, the actual outcome of the 
case may remain intact under the family-laws proposal offered here. 
 
 
 325. Miller, 598 F.3d at 151 (holding that the district attorney “impermissibly usurped and 
violated [the mother’s] fundamental right to raise her child without undue state interference”).  
 326. Doe ex rel. Doe v. Vermilion Parish Sch. Bd., 421 Fed. App’x 366 (5th Cir. 2011) (affirming 
the district court’s denial of a preliminary injunction in Doe v. Vermilion Parish School Board, No. 
6:09-CV-1565 (W.D. La. 2010)). 
 327. The mother claimed that the policy violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, various federal regulations implementing Title IX, and other laws. Id. at 368. 
 328. Doe v. Vermilion Parish Sch. Bd., No. 6:09-CV-1565 (W.D. La. 2010). On appeal, the Fifth 
Circuit held that the Equal Protection Clause does not require discriminatory intent, and remanded the 
case to the lower court to determine questions of mootness and reconsider the constitutional claims. 
Doe ex rel. Doe v. Vermilion Parish Sch. Bd., 421 Fed. App’x 366 (5th Cir. 2011). 
 329. The board responded by making the single-sex classes voluntary, but the coed classes were 
disproportionately filled with students with special needs and the single-sex classes had significantly 
higher GPAs. Id. at 370. In addition, the school admitted to using different teaching techniques in the 
single-sex classes to “tailor learning toward the strengths and needs of boys or girls.” Id. at 371. 
 330. The case is also distinguishable in that the mother was not invoking only a family law, but 
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Another area where feminist family laws could trigger serious opting-
out conflicts with public schools involves gender non-conforming and 
transgender children. As of today, several states already offer specific 
protections for gender non-conforming children.331 Nonetheless, present 
and future families may wish to opt out of a range of school policies, such 
as dress and grooming codes,332 restroom policies,333 and choice of 
name.334 The commitment of families to their gender non-conforming 
children often stems from feminist and queer ethics and from critical 
attitudes towards societal policing of gender norms. Such families, 
assuming they can satisfy the three-part test offered here,335 would be able 
to exercise the liberty to opt out of school policies or programs that 
mandate gender conformity.  
3. Vegetarian Family Laws 
How you live your vegetarian life can become a challenge because 
of this conflict in meaning—we see death in their meals, they see it 
in ours.  
—Carol Adams, Living Among Meat Eaters336 
Vegetarian families also create or adopt laws that can come into 
conflict with public school education.337 Such laws can easily satisfy the 
above characteristics of family laws. First, vegeterians often live by an 
articulable set of rules or principles. A vegan outreach website, for 
example, sets forth the following principle: “By not buying meat, eggs, 
 
 
also state and federal laws about sex equality. 
 331. States with specific protections for transgender children in schools or public accommodations 
include California, Colorado, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, New Jersey, New 
Mexico, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, Washington and the District of Columbia. SCOPE OF 
EXPLICITLY TRANSGENDER-INCLUSIVE DISCRIMINATION LAWS, NAT’L GAY & LESBIAN TASK FORCE 
FOUND. (Aug. 1, 2008), http://www.thetaskforce.org/downloads/reports/fact_sheets/TI_ antidisc_laws 
_7_08.pdf. 
 332. See, e.g., Doe v. Yunits, 15 MASS. L. RPTR. 278 (Mass. Super. 2001) (holding that a 
transgender student had stated a viable sex-discrimination claim under state law). 
 333. See, e.g., Andy Run, “Which restroom should I use?” Challenges facing transgender 
children in public schools, OFFBEAT MAMA (Sept. 6, 2011), http://offbeatmama.com/2011/09/which-
restroom-should-i-use-challenges-facing-transgender-children-in-public-schools. 
 334. See Noa Ben-Asher, Paradoxes of Health and Equality: When a Boy Becomes a Girl, 16 
YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 275 (2004) (discussing a case where a child with gender identity disorder was 
forced against the child’s gender of choice based on a certain understanding of mental health 
advocated by a school and other state authorities).  
 335. This conclusion also assumes that none of the three limitations applies. See supra Part III.B. 
 336. CAROL J. ADAMS, LIVING AMONG MEAT EATERS: THE VEGETARIAN’S SURVIVAL 
HANDBOOK 6 (Three Rivers Press 2001). 
 337. In this part I discuss vegetarianism as the umbrella category of which veganism is a branch.  
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and dairy products, we withdraw our support from cruelty to animals, 
undertake an economic boycott of factory farms, and support the 
production of cruelty-free foods.”338  
Second, personal and community narratives of vegetarians involve 
deep ethical convictions and a commitment to the interpretation of ideas 
and texts involving these convictions. Many vegetarians share a range of 
personal narratives about their transition from being meat eaters to being 
vegetarians. These narratives often incorporate inspiring themes of 
progression, ethicity, and personal development.339 As with any legal 
system, interpretation is essential to articulating vegetarian ethical 
principles. Thus, while most vegetarian systems agree that a no-meat 
eating rule is essential, opinions may vary on dairy products or plants. For 
example, animal products are clearly proscribed for vegans.340 Other 
interpretive domains include the use of animals in cases of medical 
necessity or the keeping of household pets.341 These interpretations reflect 
a commitment to a set of ethical ideas dealing with animal life. 
Third, these norms are often experienced by family members as 
binding. Many vegetarians choose to abstain from meat products because 
they would otherwise violate ethical principles such that blameworthiness 
and lawlessness would result. For example, one vegetarian complains 
about meat eaters: “[t]hey simply don’t understand that I don’t miss meat 
and I’d probably drop dead if I ate it.”342 This statement, which may not 
capture the experience of all vegetarians, reflects a sentiment analogous to 
that of the Amish in Yoder and many other religious believers: breaking 
the law is an unimaginable way of living. Once a rule has been articulated, 
it is perceived as binding and often immanent to one’s self-perception as a 
vegetarian.  
Vegetarian family laws may come into conflict with public schools. 
Consider two examples. First, classroom education about nutrition is a 
classic situation where the liberty to opt out may be necessary for the 
recognition and respect of vegetarian family laws. In the summer of 2011, 
the federal government unveiled “MyPlate,” a new guide to making 
 
 
 338. On Living with Compassion, VEGAN OUTREACH, http://www.veganoutreach.org/guide/being 
vegan.html (last visited Nov. 23, 2012). 
 339. ADAMS, supra note 336, at 6 (“To you, your vegetarianism is a natural progression in eating 
habits and philosophy. To nonvegetarians, it represents a profound disjunction.”). 
 340. Defining Vegan, VEGAN OUTREACH, http://www.veganoutreach.org/guide/definingvegan 
.html (last visited Nov. 23, 2012).  
 341. Id. 
 342. ADAMS, supra note 336, at 3 (quoting and discussing stories of collision from vegetarians).  
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healthier food choices.343 MyPlate emphasizes the fruit, vegetable, grains, 
protein, and dairy food groups. Many of the elaborated protein options and 
all of the dairy foods involve animal meat and products. Teaching school 
children about the food groups typically involves the portrayal of animals 
as legitimate sources of food. For many families this education is helpful 
and welcome, but for vegetarian and vegan families it may be 
devastating.344 Thus, some of these families choose to homeschool their 
children.345 Under the opting-out scheme proposed here, vegetarian 
families would be able to opt out of any such educational program when 
they meet the family-laws test. Perhaps such an opt-out regime would 
draw some vegetarian families who home school their children back to the 
public school system.  
Second, the dissection of frogs and other animals in science classes has 
triggered serious opting-out disputes. For example, in 1987 a lawsuit 
ensued after a fifteen-year-old vegetarian student in California refused to 
dissect a frog in biology class.346 The court ruled that mandatory 
dissections were permissible, but that a student could ask to dissect a frog 
that had died of natural causes.347 Many states today have laws that 
recognize the rights of students to opt out of such dissections.348 In line 
with this trend, the opting-out scheme proposed here would enable all 
 
 
 343. Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Agriculture, Agriculture Secretary Launch MyPlate Icon as a 
New Reminder to Help Consumers to Make Healthier Food Choices (June 2, 2011), http://www.cnpp 
.usda.gov/Publications/MyPlate/PressRelease.pdf. 
 344. Adams, for example, recounts a story in which her second grade child, who said during the 
teaching of the food pyramid in class that he does not eat meat products, to which a classmate 
responded that he would die without eating meat. ADAMS, supra note 275, at 4–5. Adams describes the 
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meat. Id. 
 345. Melanie Wilson, Homeschooling and the Vegan Family, VEGFAMILY: THE MAGAZINE FOR 
VEGAN FAMILY LIVING, http://www.vegfamily.com/vegan-children/homeschooling.htm (last visited 
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vegetarian values without the conflict inherent in public school curriculum assignments related to 
nutrition, health, animals, and the environment.”). 
 346. Pl.’s 1st Amend. Compl., Graham v. Bd. Trs. Victor Valley Union High Sch. Dist., CV-87 
03764 (C.D. Cal., filed Dec. 15, 1987); see also F. BARBARA ORLANS ET AL., THE HUMAN USE OF 
ANIMALS: CASE STUDIES IN ETHICAL CHOICE 210–13 (1998). 
 347. Id. However, the impracticality of obtaining such frogs in effect enabled the student to opt 
out of the required dissection. 
 348. Such states include: 
Florida, California, Pennsylvania, New York, Rhode Island, Illinois, Virginia, Oregon, New 
Jersey and Vermont. Student-choice legislation is currently pending in Connecticut. Maine, 
Maryland, Massachusetts and New Mexico have Board of Education policies, and Louisiana 
passed a state resolution in 1992. Many schools and school boards have also independently 
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society.org/issues/dissection/qa/questions_answers.html.  
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families, where they can demonstrate the existence of a family law that 
opposes such dissections, to opt out of any such dissections.349  
CONCLUSION 
Almost a century has passed since the Supreme Court declared the 
liberty of parents to educate their children in Meyer v. Nebraska.350 Since 
then, the quest for familial liberties has been transformed. Today, public 
schools manage the health, happiness, and values of public school citizens 
mostly through nudges, special educational programs, and surveys. 
Obviously, this governance may be beneficial to many students and to the 
general population. It is not intended as a means to repress children and 
families. However, as a recent trend in legislation indicates, courts and 
educators may need more guidance in finding the proper balance between 
familial liberties and the state’s interest in the health, happiness, and 
values of its future citizens. A fine starting point for articulating this 
balance would be the recognition and validation of the lawmaking family, 
on the left and on the right. 
 
 
 349. Of course, such dissenting students could also dissent based on individual laws as well. The 
framework of family laws, however, is helpful because it enables the more likely litigants in such 
cases—parents—to trigger the right on behalf of a child.  
 350. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).  
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